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67 
RECONCILING THE RULES OF LAW: RIGHTS 
AND PUNISHMENT 
 
BENJAMIN L. APT*  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
There is an intractable paradox in the relation between rights and 
criminal punishment.  Criminal punishment frequently conflicts with 
rights; people typically have identical rights within a legal system, yet the 
punished are unable to exercise the rights to the same extent as other 
people.  But criminal punishment, in conjunction with criminal laws, also 
operates to protect rights.  To clarify the tension between rights and 
punishment, I start by analyzing the content and purpose of rights.  Next I 
discuss the nature of rules and the particular types of rules that make up a 
typical “systems of rules.”  I then argue that legal systems are a form of a 
system of rules, and consider how rights and the laws of criminal 
punishment belong to different categories of rules.  Normally these 
categories of rules complement one another; while this holds true in the 
case of rights and punishments, they have attributes that inevitably bring 
them into conflict.  I take some time to examine the theory of right 
forfeiture because it purports to explain away the discrepancy between 
rights and punishment, but I conclude that the theory essentially 
misunderstands rights.  Finally, I put forward some broad guidelines for 
reducing the collision between punishment and rights, while 
acknowledging that these two kinds of laws will never be entirely 
compatible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
How can rights and criminal punishment coexist within the same legal 
system?  We are accustomed to the function of law as allowing some 
behavior and condemning other acts.  This is, after all, what law does: it 
tells us what we can and cannot do and directs the state to be the arbiter 
and guardian to keep the prescribed order   At first glance, then, the initial 
question might seem obtuse, for we are accustomed to rights and 
punishment corresponding comfortably: the law naturally punishes acts 
that are antagonistic to those acts and interests that it protects. 
Yet closer consideration reveals that the coexistence of rights and 
criminal punishment is not so straightforward.  The parent who disciplines 
his/her child by subjecting the child to a time out usually need not wonder 
whether the punishment oversteps the child's rights.  If it is not excessively 
cruel, the parent has the right to in how it raises its child.  The main 
considerations behind the punishment, then, are whether it will teach the 
child to avoid the targeted behavior, without being too overwhelming and 
hurtful. 
The state similarly cannot ignore reacting to acts that are explicitly 
proscribed by law.  But those whom the state punishes because they 
committed crimes are likewise beneficiaries of legal rights.  The 
punishments that the state may enact under the law will very likely 
impinge on the rights of the punished.  The criminals had rights before 
they undertook their crimes; hence the law must have some means of 
accounting for the criminal's transition from normal rights-holder to 
penalized subject.  The relationship between rights and criminal 
punishment is not clear because there must be a legally consistent 
explanation for whether punishment may impinge on rights, or, indeed, 
must.  And, if rights may be trumped by state-ordered punishment, then 
there must be a way to determine what the permissible forms are, to what 
degree and duration punishments can occur within a legal system that 
includes rights. 
This article therefore examines how the relationship between rights and 
criminal punishment can surmount their paradoxical coexistence. The 
theme of delineating the boundaries of punishment is hardly new, but 
issues around the role of punishment in a context of individual rights 
remain unresolved.1  In a previous article, I discussed the epistemological 
limitations inherent in current theories of punishment.  This present piece 
looks into one subject that we do know about punishment, that punishment 
 
 
 1. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 159 (2d ed., 1968). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/7
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collides with rights even as it serves as the law’s method for enforcing 
rights, and considers whether, and if so, how punishment and rights be 
reconciled. 
The tension between rights and criminal laws is little different from 
that between rights and any other laws.  This relationship is often labeled a 
“balancing of rights."  The phrase is comfortable name for an illusory 
calculation, however. It is correct to say that rights lend themselves to 
conflict, for in any society that recognizes rights, each rights-bearer must 
necessarily restrain his/her exercise of rights for social peace and 
cooperation.  But this adjustment, however indispensable it may be, is not 
based on an obvious formula.  We may speak of a rational weighing of 
rights, or we might resort to a Utilitarian approach to explain when some 
people's rights or interests should prevail over others.  These are 
convenient heuristics, but they do not offer irrefutable answers. 
The looseness in the joints of rights-balancing arguments becomes 
apparent in the case of criminal punishment.  Crimes, which help define 
the limits of rights, warrant their own justifications.  But it is during the 
accomplishment of the punishment consequent on the conviction for a 
crime that questions about the reasons and extent for restricting criminal's 
rights are the most pressing. It seems logical that punishment follows from 
criminal laws; if certain acts are outlawed, then surely the authority 
responsible for enforcing the law must execute sanctions against those 
who commit crimes. Yet, for all that punishment follows behind the 
prosecution for crimes, there is no evident "correct" balance between the 
necessity of punishment and the truncation of specific rights. 
This article seeks to clarify the dilemma of rights and punishment 
through the following process.  It begins in Section II with what I 
understand rights to be, how they become instituted in legal systems, and 
to what end.  In the next section, Section III, in preparation for the 
explication in Section IV of rights as a type of rule, I first investigate (in 
Subsection A) the nature of rules, defining the major categories of rules 
that, combined, are essential to any system of rules.  All rules belong 
within encompassing systems of rules. Rather, all rules necessarily divide 
into different functional categories within a comprehensive, reticulated 
web.  I delineate the different categories and some of the subcategories of 
rules and review how they relate to one another.  The reason for this brief 
spelunking expedition into the recesses of the structure of rules is 
illuminated in Section III, Subsection B, where I outline how legal systems 
are a kind of rules systems, complete with the three main categories of 
rules, and their correlate subcategories. Subsection C of Section III gives 
attention to some of the limitations of rules in general and what I call 
"compositional rules" in particular, and the ways in which these 
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limitations become manifest in rights, which is a type of "compositional 
law.”  In these respective subsections, I review how rules, and rights, can 
steer people's behavior, but also where their efficacy peters out, and thus 
what responsibilities people have when they participate in rules systems. 
Section IV tackles rights and punishment as complementary types of 
laws-as rules.  Here we confront the ways in which these two forms of 
rules function conjointly, yet also, unavoidably, conflict, specifically, why 
punishment helps to shore up rights, yet infringes on them at the same 
time. 
Section V focuses on the theory of Rights Forfeiture.  I diverge into a 
debate with this particular perspective on rights and punishment for 
several reasons.  First, Rights Forfeiture is one of the few arguments that 
address the relationship between rights and criminal punishment.  Second, 
although I reject the theory in good part, not least because I believe it 
mischaracterizes rights, it contains a hard kernel of truth in its account of 
the effect of criminal punishment on the status of rights and, to this extent, 
must be taken into account as an alternative position. 
Finally, in Section VI, the Conclusion, I offer some suggestions for 
how rights and punishment can be reconciled.  I admit here that I conjure 
up no neat solution to the paradox of rights and punishment.  Nevertheless, 
the process of the article's argument helps, I hope, to elucidate their 
uneasy, and necessary, coexistence.  
 
I. A DEFINITION OF RIGHTS 
A.   Rights as Strictly Legal Entities 
To understand just how rights and criminal punishment clash, we first 
must establish what we mean by “rights.” This is a tricky task for there is 
no clear consensus on the definition of this word. It has been interpreted in 
multifarious ways in different national constitutions and philosophical 
works. Some would argue that, because the term “rights” has become so 
inherent in popular parlance, its most worthwhile definition is to be found 
in common usage: what non-lawyers mean when they use the term.2 The 
problem with this approach is that there is no way to determine just how 
the word is understood in the general population, or just how many 
meanings it bears in popular usage.  Were we to settle on a common usage 
of “rights, it is not self-evident that any common usage of the word would 
be internally consistent.  
 
 
 2. See Rowan Cruft, Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?, 23 LAW & PHIL. 
347 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/7
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Nearly a hundred years ago, Wesley Hohfield tried to shine light on the 
“chameleon-hued words” of rights and duties by plotting the jural 
relationships, both correlative and opposing, of rights and duties, and their 
ancillary concepts (no-right, privilege, power, immunity, disability and 
liability).3 While his schema may elucidate the demands and opportunities 
that rights provide, it does not explain what rights are, why and how they 
came to be, and how they fit into the larger realm of the law. These 
questions are critical in order to understand the relationship of state-
conducted criminal punishment to rights. 
Two competing philosophies of rights have developed in response to 
Hohfield’s analysis, the Interest Theory and the Will Theory. The 
definition proposed in this article cuts closer to the former but does not 
entirely conform to it. While Hohfield’s progeny recognize the function of 
a legal system in instituting rights, they do not explain just what rights are 
as legal artifacts. Matthew Kramer, for instance, observes:  
Being endowed with a legal right which Hohfield also labelled as a 
claim consists in being legally protected against someone else’s 
interference or against someone else’s withholding of assistance or 
remuneration, in regard to a certain action or a certain state of affairs. . . . 
A genuine right or claim is enforceable.4 
 Some philosophers have recognized rights as subjective claims on the 
social institutions that enforce rights.5 Yet even these writers tend to 
highlight the subjective element of the “claim” over the objective role of 
the state as definer and defender of rights. This emphasis is imbalanced. 
Rights do not exist apart from a society’s provisions for achieving 
enforceability.  
Political theorists are perhaps more inclined to situate rights within the 
domain of the state, most commonly, within democracies.6 But a focus on 
the political structure that makes rights feasible risks narrowing the 
meaning of rights in the other direction. The political theory of rights tends 
to perceive them as tools that abet democratic governance through 
common participation. The subjective element of rights consequently gets 
lost in their practical use as the means by which people exercise self-
government. But the origin of rights cannot be explained by the political 
 
 
 3. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFIELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING 35–64 (1946). 
 4. Matthew H. Kramer, Rights without Trimmings, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRIES 9 (Matthew H. Kramer, N.E. Simmonds & Hillel Steiner eds., 1998). 
 5. See Susan James, Rights as Enforceable Claims, 103 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 133, 
139–42 (2003); ONORA O’NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF 
PRACTICAL REASONING (1996). 
 6. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 88–89 (1989). 
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structure that makes them feasible. Democracy gives rise to only a limited 
number of rights centered on political participation. It does not account for 
all the rights that a legal system may incorporate.  Rights are not reducible 
to the functional tenets of a particular political system.   Rights are only 
fully comprehended when both aspects, their subjective value and their 
legal function, are taken into account. 
As I will explore further in this article, there is a natural, or at least a 
deep-seated, basis in human sentiment for why the law encodes certain 
rights; but this ought not be confused with the notion that rights 
themselves are natural.  They are a social creation, embodied in the law.  
People may lay claim to rights because they exist under the law.7 Thus 
rights are not anchored in subjectivity, as proposed by both the Interest 
Theory and the Will Theory, but rather in a category of legal provisions.8  
Rights are neither natural nor moral attributes.  They are legal creations, 
the political and legal fruition of particular events and concerns in 
particular societies at specific times. 
Even common usage of the term “rights” recognizes that its ultimate 
meaning lies in the law. We proclaim that we will see our rights enforced, 
by which we mean that we will, if necessary, resort to the legal machinery 
of the state to pursue their fulfillment. Rights, as legal entities, are 
therefore necessarily judicable and enforceable, whether they are formally 
codified in a constitution or through statutes, or are judicial formulations 
of customs, rights are laws and do not exist apart from law. Thus if we are 
talking about an interest or desire that does not meet the practicable 
attributes of rights within a legal system, then we are not speaking of 
rights but instead of some other normative proposition. 
While rights may be perceived by their proponents as grounded in 
universal principles—on a presumption of cross-cultural commonalities—
they are, I will argue, inevitably various by society and period. Here is 
where my definition diverges somewhat from the interest theory. Interest 
theory describes rights as atemporal: “The interest theory of rights…is an 
account of the nature of rights as such. Basically, the theory maintains that 
A’s having a right to something means that there is an aspect of A’s well-
being, (i.e., an interest of A) that is important enough to justify imposing a 
duty on some other person(s) in respect to that interest.”9 “Important 
enough” is a tautology. For whatever reasons, the lawmakers who were 
 
 
 7. Rights as claims have a long heritage. I am not arguing here that it is an erroneous 
characterization of rights, but is simply incomplete because it ignores both the reason for their 
existence and their law-dependent function.  See, e.g., H.J. McCloskey, Rights, 15 PHIL. Q. 115 
(1965).  
           8.  See supra notes 3–4. 
 9. Andrei Marmor, On the Limits of Rights, 16 LAW & PHIL. 1, 3 (1997) (footnote omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/7
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endowed with the power to make rights chose to codify certain human 
inclinations, wishes, and abilities in these legal protections. Moreover, the 
“duties” that Marmor mentions here are those that are imposed, not just on 
other people, but also on the state itself as guarantor of rights. 
Rights are effectuated either by state action or by individuals (or 
members of a group) who call on the laws and legal fora provided by the 
state to ensure their remediation or fulfillment.  Rights are thus not 
aspirational ideals or natural truths, but rather legal standards. They are 
humanly-created, historically-situated legal rules. They vary by society, 
and within each society, they change over time.  Rights codify the 
assortment of capabilities and interests that their creators recognized as 
“rights-worthy.” Rights are not natural attributes. They are not physical or 
psychological human characteristics that we can point to, but, rather, are a 
socially created way of regarding people within a legal system. 
A legal system may limit the application of rights to a defined group 
within the larger society. A familiar example is the distinction between the 
rights of a country’s citizens as opposed to those of alien residents. 
Different societies recognize diverse rights. Indeed, the same ostensible 
right may be understood variously in different societies. While the current 
German constitution, the Grundgesetz, safeguards freedom of expression, 
it shields personal honor (Ehrverletzung) to a greater degree than does 
U.S. law.10 Germany’s legal prohibitions against organized gatherings 
sympathetic to Nazism, or the display or utterance of pro-Nazi symbols 
and statements, may also strike Americans as a stark infringement of free 
expression.11 Such limitations are inevitable—separate political entities set 
their own rights—yet they are also prone to questionable delineations. 
Where rights start and stop is not always logically apparent or amenable to 
clear decisions of enforcement. 
With the rise of international political organizations, such as the United 
Nations or the European Union, has come a corresponding development of 
a universal definition of human rights. These international agreements are 
no less historically contingent than the national notions of rights. Human 
rights treaties have sparked further contention over what qualifies as 
universal rights, as well as an all too frequent failure of international 
 
 
          10. See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutchland [GG] [Basic Law] May 23, 1949, 
Art. 5, § 2 translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html.  
          11. Restrictions on public assembly and on forms of public expression reflecting Nazi-
oriented political views are written into the German criminal code. The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
reaffirmed this legal exception to the constitutional protections of free expression and the freedom to 
assemble in 2009. BVerfG, 1 BvR 2150/08. Nov. 4, 2009. See an analysis of the high court’s opinion 
in Christoph Goerisch, Das Grundrecht der Meinungsfreiheit im Lichte des Historikerstreits, in 
Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft [KritV], Heft 2, (2011). 
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bodies to ensure their effective enforcement. The content of human rights 
are no different from those of more confined legal bodies, as we will 
explore in the next section. It is the practicability of a corpus of 
international human rights that has proven less certain. 
B.   The Content of Rights 
The purpose of rights is to safeguard specific human abilities, 
potentialities, and interests from trespass or deleterious disregard by the 
state and other people. More precisely, rights are politically instituted 
safeguards and promises that the state provides to protect human abilities 
and interests. 12 While the reasons for instituting rights within a legal 
system lie in a society's norms or moral principles, rights are distinct in 
that they are legal instantiations of these values.  Because rights are 
established through the legal system, they do not precede the political 
state.  Rights themselves created by law; pace Locke, they do not precede 
the state but are a creation of the political state.13 However, rights function 
as primary rules of the legal system and, as such, they control the legal 
actions of the state. Rights can either restrain the state from interference 
with an individual’s exercise of their abilities and the pursuit of their 
interests, or they may go further, and require the state to intervene by 
providing support and protection for these activities and interests.14 
This does not mean that all human abilities and interests are necessarily 
captured in a particular society’s corpus of rights. Rights cover only those 
abilities, including potential abilities that the people who created a 
particular society’s fundamental laws chose to recognize or that legal 
tradition has come to preserve. Rights as a legal manifestation are 
therefore a historical creation.15 This does not mean that they are 
unalterable. On the contrary, those abilities, potentialities, and interests 
that have not found their way into a society’s express rights could yet be 
 
 
 12.  By limiting the definition to human concerns, I am not adamantly precluding the 
attribution of rights to animals or other entities.  However, I do believe that rights are above all 
modeled around the interests of those beings who create them, that is, humans. 
 13.  See David Alm, Self-Defense, Punishment and Forfeiture, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 91, 93 
(2013). 
      14. H.L.A. Hart, although otherwise doubtful about the existence of natural rights, allowed 
for one, “the equal right of all men to be free.” However, Hart allowed for the existence of “moral 
rights.” How he distinguished between a moral right and a norm that attributes certain values to 
individuals is not apparent. I argue that he use of “right” in this way confused the meaning of right and 
moral regard of individuals. See H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 175–
76 (1955). Even philosophers who categorically dismiss the possibility of natural rights sometimes 
speak of “moral rights” as a discrete type of right from “legal” rights. See, e.g., RAYMOND GUESS, 
HISTORY AND ILLUSION IN POLITICS 131–52 (2001). 
 15. Consequently I do not speak of “legal” rights, because that would be redundant. Rights 
are by definition legal concepts. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/7
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identified and promoted through political advocacy. Rights are not static, 
but they can change as people perceive new abilities and interests that they 
wish to include under the legal umbrella of rights. What is constant in the 
definition of rights is that they are based, not just on norms, but also on 
human attributes: abilities, potentialities, and interests.  Rights are not 
“supra-temporal.”  That is, they do not exist somehow outside of history.  
Legal systems can incorporate new rights, or deem some rights obsolete.16  
How any given state promotes its population’s rights is determined by 
its policies, resources, and the political pressure from its constituents and 
organized interests. Where people have a right to move freely throughout 
their country, for instance, the state is not bound to construct a specific 
means of transportation. The state supports that right, rather, by enhancing 
the means for people’s mobility in balance with the use of its resources for 
other matters, and with other policies, such as protecting the environment. 
Similarly, a right to a basic public education is meaningless without 
sufficient suitable schools and public access to them. In short, rights are 
not just legal protections of individual interests and abilities, but also 
entail public endeavors that enable the use of human abilities and interests.  
As such, while there are no “natural rights,” rights have a “natural” 
component. They originate social recognition of human activities and 
interests. These natural attributes are the rationale behind creation of 
rights. Through rights, a society’s legal system allows for activities that 
people can or may wish to do. Still more, rights do not just grant legal 
“room” for the undertaking of activities; they commit the state, and the 
population itself, to honoring and even abetting those activities through 
goods and services. Rights are the conversion of principles and norms into 
laws for the purpose of binding the state to protect and advance the 
exercise of abilities and the satisfaction of interests (under which I include 
needs, such as food, education, the possibility for recreation) that a society 
values. This is not to say that rights are exhausted in the advancement of 
only the most exiguous human actions and needs. Rights can incorporate 
principles that are felt no less deeply for their being abstract. Fairness, just 
distribution, mercy for the disadvantaged, recognition for effort, access to 
good nutrition, and medical advances, may be as essential a value in a 
society as one’s ability to provide for one’s own physical needs. 
None of this is to say that all human abilities, interests, needs, and 
principles are somehow automatically manifested as rights. 17 That might 
 
 
 16. See RAYMOND GEUSS, PHILOSOPHY AND REAL POLITICS 64–70 (2008). 
 17. Thus rights are not limited to roles or just to the current interests and abilities of people, 
pace Wenar, but, rather, allow for the future exploration and expansion of abilities and interests. See 
Leif Wenar, The Nature of Claim Rights, 123 ETHICS 202, 206–11 (2013). 
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make sense in theory, but rights do not exist in theory; they are legal 
creations. Rights must be recognized in order to exist. Rights are 
fundamental “normative compositional laws” that grant a special, 
foundational status to designated human abilities, interests, and 
possibilities. These fundamental laws underlie and regulate the remaining 
corpus of a society’s laws. But not all recognized abilities or interests 
taken up into rights. Societies leave those activities that are socially 
undesirable or cruel outside of the plenum of rights. 
Rights address abilities, rather than the activities in which they find 
expression, because abilities are more general and basic, and thus less pre-
determined.18  Rights protect what people might do with their abilities, 
including how they might develop them. This is why it is crucial that one 
keep in mind that rights extend to potentialities; in other words, rights 
encompass the possibility of future abilities that people may acquire or 
enhance. “Activities” is too restrictive a term to capture satisfactorily the 
meaning of rights. The term mistakenly limits rights to certain state-
sanctioned acts and does not adequately capture the unanticipated human 
actions and interests that people may wish to exercise. There are 
exceptions, especially in regard to rights that serve to preserve rights. In 
countries that have a right for people to assemble in order to petition the 
government, for example, that right exists because lawmakers deem it 
critical to the functioning of a fair legal system.  For the most part, 
however, rights are open rather than narrow protections of abilities, 
potentialities, and interests. The basis of the right to free expression is not 
limited to its importance for unfettered political communication. Rather, it 
stems from the human ability to communicate, and humans’ interest in 
doing so. 
The reason for rights is not confined to those abilities that can have 
social repercussions. The ability for someone simply to move his or her 
arms may seem too trivial to warrant an explicit legal protection. In itself, 
this action has no social significance. So, too, is thinking too private an 
activity, it might appear, to warrant legal protection. Yet people can 
certainly pressure or influence one another to such a degree that their 
thinking is hindered by the belief that some thoughts are forbidden. 
Indeed, being able to move one’s hands or to think free from fear are 
suitable abilities for the legal protection and support supplied by rights. 
 
 
          18.      The definition of rights presented here may seem somewhat reminiscent of the 
Capabilities Approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. However, their argument 
assumes a normative definition. Despite a generous list of the ten threshold Central Capabilities, they 
nevertheless promote a limited set of rights. My purpose is here is simply to clarify the concept 
“rights.” See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
APPROACH 32–35 (2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/7
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This is evident in the need for protections for people who are physically or 
mentally disabled or to counter physical abuse and isolation. 
I include “potentialities” here because rights can include the possibility 
of abilities people have not yet acquired or developed. The word 
“potentialities” encompasses those abilities that people may develop in the 
future, whether through personal development or through larger social 
changes, such as advances in technology.  Potentialities are the individual 
capacities a person can acquire within his or her lifetime no less than they 
do to capabilities humans develop over the centuries. 
Individuals grow into rights as they mature into sovereign, decision-
making adults.  So, too, can societies develop, through technological 
changes, through cultural integration brought about by immigration, so as 
to need new rights or expanded interpretation of existent ones.  Children 
and adults who are in some way psychologically or intellectually disabled 
have rights because they have abilities and interests, however much they 
require the help of others to meet those interests, which can change and 
expand over time.  Should this individual gain the ability to move more, 
the right already stands open to her. Were this not the case, were the 
person to have to prove her abilities to the state in order to gain the “right” 
to movement, she would not be enjoying a right at all, but rather a would 
not be a right at all, but rather an authorized privilege.19 
All children grow into more rights as their abilities, interests, and 
comprehensions develop. Until people are sufficiently mature—the law 
typically marks this change with formal thresholds—they have rights, but 
the advocacy of their rights is invested by proxy in their parents or 
guardians. Children have fewer immediate rights, but the rights and legal 
obligations of their care borne by their parents compensate for their 
immature condition. Moreover, children possess the legal “promissory 
note” of future rights when they mature into the abilities and interests of 
adults. 
Technology can bear on rights by introducing new abilities. Before the 
invention of powered flight, there was no reason to push for a right to fly. 
That technological change to human possibilities produced a new basis for 
 
 
 19. Imagine, in contrast, a society where rights are not universally attributed, but are, rather, 
available only upon a person’s proof of applicable capability. Only when one demonstrated the ability 
to use a right may one take advantage of it. Such a parsimonious interpretation of rights would have a 
chilling effect on the use of rights. People would be unsure about which rights they could legally rely 
on. They would have to overcome the daunting legal presumption that they were ineligible for specific 
rights by proving that they can take advantage of them. In a legal dispute involving the infringement of 
a right, the complainant would first have to convince the court of his or her capacity to use it. Only 
after overcoming this first test could the complainant proceed to introduce evidence that the defendant 
had abridged it. 
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a new right. So, too, can cultural developments produce new grounds for 
specific rights by introducing new abilities and interests. There was no 
debate over a right to Internet access until the technology of the internet 
became, not just available, but an important medium for communication 
and information.  
Including potentialities among the human qualities that serve as the 
source of rights does not require a legal code of rights to anticipate all 
potentialities.  A society’s collection of rights will never recognize every 
human ability or interest precisely because there is no definitive list, or 
definition, of what these are.20 This is all the more reason, then, that the 
very mutability and expansiveness of human abilities and interests must be 
accounted for in the concept of rights.21 
“Interests” refers to the motivations, the desires and perceived needs, 
which are as fundamental as abilities. The term “interests” extends to what 
are often called “social goods,” such as education or affordable housing, 
which are critical for people to be able to exploit their abilities. In other 
words, interests are not just motivations. They are also those needs and 
wishes, the fulfillment of which enables people further to exercise their 
abilities and potentialities, to survive and thrive. Without adequate 
nutrition, for instance, people cannot enjoy their ability to act and think. 
Without legal protection for people’s corporal integrity, through laws 
banning violence and laws those promoting safety, all other abilities and 
interests are tenuous. 
As I noted earlier, a society’s corpus of rights is not fixed and 
unchanging. Just as the activities people do (if not their physical abilities) 
can fall out of custom, and other new skills and pursuits appear, so, too, 
are the rights that cover these abilities through redrafting or broader 
interpretation. Indeed, a right can become obsolete if it has been codified 
very narrowly and the activity it safeguards falls out of use. There are 
many reasons why any single activity or interest becomes noticed in the 
legal consciousness of a society. For example, in a society with a history 
of religious factionalism or discrimination, the urge to protect religious 
practices may be paramount.  A secular society, or a society with a single 
religion, on the other hand, may not have a right to religious freedom 
because it perceives no need for it. 
This goes to another aspect of the composition of rights: there is no 
rule for how general or specific a right must be. However, the more 
 
 
 20. Jack N. Rakove lays out the difficulties of “enumerating” and “textualizing” rights 
comprehensively in The Dilemma of Declaring Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN 
FOUNDING AND BEYOND (Barry Alan Shain, ed., 2007). 
 21. See David A.J. Richards, Rights, Utility, and Crime, 3 CRIME & JUST. 247, 262–65 
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris, eds., 1981). 
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general the right, the more adaptable it is. Those abilities, potentialities, 
and interests that do not find their way into a society’s set of recognized 
rights at any one time are possible sources of additional rights. They may 
become instituted as rights in the future, whether through express 
accretion or expanded interpretation of existent rights. Even the most 
liberal body of rights, one that represents the broadest conceivable range 
of socially non-iniquitous human activities, potentialities, and interests, 
cannot recognize or anticipate every human ability and interest.  Abilities, 
potentialities, and interests are inherently unforeseeable and mutable. An 
ideal “complete” group of rights is unrealizable. 
Laws themselves can also influence people’s capabilities and interests. 
A democratic form of government produces the “abilities” for self-
government. The ability to vote or otherwise to participate in directing the 
composition of the ruling government, along with the interest in doing so, 
is as crucial to a person’s wellbeing in a society as the expression of other, 
more natural abilities. Petitioning the courts for legal redress or voting in 
elections are rights because these are legally engendered abilities, even 
though they do not exist outside the particular societies that have 
established them. Citizens vote to express their interests and preferences 
and to help mold the laws by which they are governed. (People can elect a 
dictatorial regime that restricts suffrage and quashes other rights. In short, 
nothing prevents people from using their abilities against their own 
interests.) 
Because rights are human creations, societies may choose to establish 
rights as a component of their legal systems or they may not. There is no 
eternal, pre-existent overarching right to rights. Rights are grounded in 
abilities, interests and principles, but they result from moral and logical 
arguments. Rights come into being depending on the success of advocates 
who campaign to have abilities, interests, and potentialities protected and 
sustained by law.  
With rights come responsibilities. Every legal system that incorporates 
rights assumes that people are capable of understanding that they live in a 
society and that they have moral responsibilities to others.  Rights 
consequently contain a paradox. While they are only necessary in social 
settings, where people ineluctably come into conflict with one another 
while engaging their abilities and interests, rights must also be restrained 
within society.  One person’s enjoyment of her right can easily impinge on 
another person’s rights. The need for balanced restrictions on rights is thus 
inherent in the existence of rights. As regulative devices for the exercise of 
abilities and potentialities in society, rights can lead to legal clashes that 
the state, the enforcer of rights, must mediate. The law thus sets 
boundaries to people’s activities, to their pursuit of the abilities and 
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interests, which restrict rights. The state accomplishes this control in part 
through the establishment and enforcement of criminal laws, including 
criminal punishment. 
To summarize, the main elements in the definition of rights are that 
they are: (1) Legal creations established and often modified by societies; 
(2) the purpose of which is to shield and promote certain human abilities, 
potentialities and interests, current as well as conjectured, as the society 
has historically come to value them and; (3) the preservation, and 
sometimes the fulfillment, of which is ultimately attributed to the state 
under law. 
 
II. RULES AND RIGHTS 
 
A.   The Nature of Rules 
 
Legal systems are systems of rules. The notion that the law is similar to 
a body of rules is hardly new. J.L. Austin used the model, as did H.L.A. 
Hart somewhat later. Under the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hart 
analyzed the relationship with great perception in The Concept of Law.22  
Hart distinguishes between “primary” and “secondary” rules. With 
primary rules, “human beings are required to do or abstain from certain 
actions, whether they wish to or not.”23 Hart explains: 
Rules of the first [i.e., primary] type impose duties; rules of the 
second [i.e., secondary] type confer powers, public or private. Rules 
of the first type concern actions involving physical movement or 
changes; rules of the second type provide for operations which lead 
not merely to physical movement or change, but to the creation or 
variation of duties or obligation.24 
The discussion about rules here is different from Hart’s approach.25 I 
argue that rules are comprehensible only within a context of a web of 
 
 
 22. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Peter Cane, Tony Tony Honoré & Jane 
Stapleton eds., 2d ed. 1994). Hart drew on his study of the linguistic philosophy of J.L. Austin, as well 
as his consideration of the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the early writings of John Rawls. 
See NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM 219–20 
(2004). 
           23. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 81. Note that Hart is already assuming a 
similarity between rules and law; otherwise, he would not write about “humans” and what they are 
“required” to do were he merely described rules of game. 
           24. Id. 
 25. There is debate over whether Hart even viewed law as a form of rules. Scott Shapiro 
argues that Hart, no less than Dworkin, believed that judicial discretion was indispensable because of 
the inevitable limitations of language. Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide 
for the Perplexed (Yale Law Sch. Working Paper No. 77, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=96857. See 
also Timothy Endicott, Are There Any Rules?, 5 J. ETHICS 199 (2001). 
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rules, what I term a “rule system.” With this term, I am not speaking of the 
development of rules within a communal, shared “form of life” in a 
Wittgensteinian sense.26 Rather, I refer to the way that rules function. 
Rules are only comprehensible to those who use them within a complex of 
types of rules. There are different types of rules within any rules system. 
Below I lay out the three main sub-categories. I will discuss the nature of 
rules first and then move on to laws, specifically rights. 
What follows are not rules about how rules should work. That is, I am 
not setting out rules for rules. Rather, I propose a description of the 
multivalent structure of rules systems to explain how rules function to 
communicate directions for behavior. We may not be aware of each of the 
sub-categories of rules that identify or of how they work in conjunction 
with one another. But these different types of rules are, together, necessary 
for us to think effectively with rules.  
Thinking . . . seems to require, like speech, the capacity to follow 
rules. . . . Deny that there are such things as rules, deny that there is 
anything that counts strictly as rule-following, and you put in 
jeopardy some of our most central notions about ourselves. More 
than that, you also put in jeopardy our notion of the world as 
requiring us, given our words and concepts, to describe it this way 
rather than that; you undermine our conception of objective 
characterization.27 
Rules are complex linguistic entities. They are not simply propositions; 
indeed, they have little in common with assertions of truth or opinion truth 
assertions. They do not describe or analyze. Rather, they create, when 
complied with by corresponding behavior, states of actuality. Rules are 
among the most socially complex of linguistic constructs. Rules assume a 
complex of social arrangements, among which authority, compliance, 
perpetual cooperation, are just some of the elements.  Without this web of 
relationships, rules are merely perplexing and ineffectual commands or 
statements. 
The purpose of rules is to be purposive. That is, rules set out an ordered 
series of actions for a particular activity. They prescribe a set of 
components and steps for the achievement of an activity. Rules may be 
derived norms, but they differ from norms in that they specify permitted 
actions (as well as proscribed actions) rather than indicating which actions 
ought, or ought not, to be done. 
 
 
          26. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 96 (1982). 
          27. PHILIP PETTIT, THE REALITY OF RULE-FOLLOWING, IN RULE-FOLLOWING AND MEANING 
192–93 (Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright, eds., 2002). 
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Not all purposive activities are controlled by rules. For example, 
building a wooden table from scratch depends on a number of actions, 
such as milling the legs and the surface. The order of these actions is not 
strictly rule controlled, but existence of the table depends on the requisite 
steps for making its pieces and assembling them. Rule-directed activities, 
in contrast, are dependent on the rules that guide and define them. The 
successful passage of a proposed bill will only work if the legislature 
abides by set rules; otherwise, the bill will be deemed illegitimate and will 
not become law. The legislative process is tied to rules, and that is no less 
true for the product of that process. 
Rules are also distinguishable from commands. Commands are 
directions to carry out specific tasks, whereas rules are guides to how tasks 
are to be done. Rules are more generic, less bound to individual situations, 
than commands. With commands, someone with attributed authority 
orders other people to do an action; the command may not bother to 
describe how the action should be done but only its outcome. Conversely, 
a command may direct the steps, without bothering to mention a purpose 
or specify an outcome. Moreover, commands exist in the present; they 
address certain people with the goal of getting an activity done at a certain 
time. Rules, in contrast, exist beyond the occasion of their initial 
promulgation or formalization, and their authority is independent of the 
status of a single person. They involve a range of elements, from the 
people to whom they apply to the actions these people are to do. 
Individual rules do not make sense in isolation. A single rule cannot 
indicate to whom it applies, or the circumstances under which it should be 
followed, or the location and other physical elements that are involved.  
Rules function only within a larger set of rules, what I call a system of 
rules. I use the term “system of rules” to refer to the internal properties of 
rules, that is, the multilayer structure that necessarily underlies every body 
of rules.28 All systems of rules comprise three sub-categories or types of 
rules. I will refer to the three subcategories as “compositional,” 
“procedural,” and “consequential” rules. When we think of rules, we most 
likely conjure up just one: procedural rules. This type of rule specifies the 
actions to be done in a certain order or manner. However, procedural rules 
rest on compositional rules and are usually associated with consequential 
rules governing their completion or violation. 
Although compositional rules are essential to any system of rules, they 
are not always explicit. Compositional rules encompass a large variety of 
 
 
 28. My use of the term “system of rules” therefore differs from the more familiar idea of 
distinct bodies of rules, with their specific constituencies, as outlined, e.g., in SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, 
LEGALITY 11–12 (2011). 
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rules. They specify the environment or jurisdiction of the system of rules, 
that is, where the rules pertain: a checkerboard, a soccer field, a legislative 
session, a voting booth, a country. They also address to whom the rules 
apply. The compositional rules in a board game, for instance, dictate the 
number of players and their qualifications, if any. 
In short, compositional rules set out the components of the rules 
system, from the realm where the rules apply to the participants to all the 
pieces or equipment to be used, such as dice, cards, an hourglass, a pencil, 
and a scorecard. Or the officers, the symbols and dress signifying their 
office, and the tools of their tasks, such as the means to record minutes of 
gatherings. In a legal system, the compositional “rules” define a range of 
essential traits. Among these are the legal system’s jurisdiction, to any 
laws that are considered principle to the legitimacy of any other laws, to 
the legal processes for creating, amending, and revoking laws, to the basic 
function of the political order, including the use of a constitution. 
Frederick Schauer offers an analysis of rules that falls part way within 
the orbit of what I’m describing here. His description is useful as a 
heuristic to elucidate the operation of rules, albeit in a rather different 
perspective. Schauer writes that “[o]ne part of any rule…specifies the 
scope of the rule, the factual conditions triggering the application of the 
rule.”29 He further recognized that rules “contain . . . the consequent, 
prescribing what is to happen when the condition specified in the factual 
predicate obtain.” In breaking rules into “parts,” Schauer approaches the 
structure of multiple rule-types that I refer to as the subcategories 
composing rule systems. By “scope,” Schauer refers to something akin to, 
if narrower than, compositional rules, although he blends it with 
consequential rules. Schauer’s term pertains to those conditions when a 
certain rule obtains. He uses the example of driving within the legal speed 
limit: a person who drives over the speed limit is subject to being fined. In 
doing so, Schauer combines compositional aspects—a person, operating a 
car, on a public road—with other kinds of rules, such as procedural laws 
that govern driving in public, and consequential laws determining what 
happens when another person authorized (under the rules/laws) to enforce 
the procedural rules in relation to the pertinent compositional rules drives 
in a manner prohibited by the procedural rules. 
Some rule systems are joined voluntarily. One need not play baseball. 
When one does, however, the usual rules of baseball will obtain—unless 
the players choose to modify the rules from the traditional or official 
 
 
 29. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 23 (1991). 
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standards. The tenth person who shows up to play with a team will simply 
not be able to join in because the rules limit the number of players on the 
field to nine. Compositional rules thus set boundaries to the attributes of 
participants covered by the rules system. 
In other cases, a person’s participation is not voluntary—the rules are 
imposed on people according to conditions that the rules define. A student 
must follow certain rules while in school, and has little choice in the 
matter. So, too, do the rules of any given language apply to all who use the 
language; even when one purposely takes liberties with these rules, the 
significance of such play lies in the surprise and provocation of the 
linguistic violations. One can choose to become subject to a new group of 
language-rules by learning and using a new language. Membership in the 
rules system is voluntary, although the rules themselves are mandatory and 
frequently quite strict. There are exceptions even here: languages that have 
restricted uses, such as languages that are reserved for religious purposes 
or that are secret (like codes) are not open to every willing member. 
In Schauer’s example above, the person who chooses to drive is subject 
to the laws of the road. These laws prevail, not merely when someone 
chooses to undertake a rule-controlled activity, but because the person 
lives in a society governed by laws, among which are laws for operating a 
car. While the laws for driving are specific to that activity, they are part of 
a much larger whole, which is the legal system of a society that sets the 
laws for many activities.  
There are different categories of rules within the subcategory of 
compositional rules. One type of compositional rules concerns, as we have 
seen, the substantial elements, such as the people who are subject to the 
rules, the area in which the rules function, and any other objects that are 
pertinent to the rule-defined activities. Another kind of compositional rule 
is the “normative compositional rule.” These rules incorporate the norms 
or principles incumbent on the participants in the rules system. 
The difference between norms that are adopted as rules and those that 
are not are that the former have an express, specific role within the rules 
system, while the latter apply to overall behavior. For example, the norm 
that lying is bad is a general social norm. Yet it may not be a norm within 
the particular rules system. An example is the old TV game show, “To 
Tell the Truth,” in which a panel of three people made misleading 
statements about their characters, and the other players asked them 
questions to try to suss out the true figure among them. Newspapers 
supposedly commit themselves to a normative compositional rule of 
accuracy, which finds expression in the procedural rules of fact checking. 
In the adversarial trial process, witnesses must testify honestly, but the 
task of revealing the truth lies with the questioning by the opposing 
lawyers. A explicit normative compositional rule in the adversarial process 
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is truthfulness—perjury is a crime— but only in accordance with precise 
procedural rules, which entails that witnesses give testimony solely in 
response to the questions posed by the attorneys or judge. The witness is 
not permitted to offer the truth about the defendant’s alleged acts in the 
fashion he or she might be impelled to do. Another normative 
compositional rule is the proper manner of the lawyers. They may not 
harangue witnesses or reinterpret their testimony.  Another is the 
presumption of innocence.30 
Normative compositional rules exist in all systems of rules. A most 
basic example is the requirement that all participants abide by the rules or, 
if they wish to alter them, that they pursue changes only in a manner 
prescribed by procedural rules, perhaps using compositional rules of 
interpretation. This is not to say that the compositional rules in every rule 
system contain the same strictures for emendation. Some systems of rules 
allow for changes more liberally and casually than others. Some may be 
less strict about conformity to specific rules. 
Procedural rules dictate the actions to be undertaken in the system of 
rules. The procedural rules of a board game, for instance, designate what 
moves players may make, when they may do them (e.g., taking turns, or 
continuing after winning a round), with which pieces. They also include 
proscribed actions, that is, acts that players may not perform, such as 
playing out of turn, switching pieces, moving in a different direction on 
the board or field. Where functions or assignments vary among the 
participants, the roles are indicated by the compositional rules, but the 
functions, the actions associated with the different roles, are laid out in the 
procedural rules. 
There is good reason that procedural rules are thought of as the core of 
 
 
  30.      The “innere Fuehrung Prinzip” is an example of a principle transformed into a law, yet 
that, as a law, retains much of the character of a principle or basic ethical norm. The soldier serving in 
the Bundeswehr is not expected to have a sophisticated knowledge of international human rights laws. 
Rather, he is expected, indeed, required, to rely on his or her personal perception and discretion to 
decide when an order is so reprehensible or immoral that it cannot be obeyed. Because it is a principle, 
“innere Fuehrung” does not and cannot specify just which orders must be resisted. This “Prinzip” is an 
instance in which a principle—the principle that soldiers should act on their deeply held principles— is 
made available as a legal standard that a soldier can rely on it as a credible legal defense. Yet, as a 
principle, it remains ambiguous and leaves a great deal of responsibility to the individual soldier to 
interpret and defend. See Innere Führung Selbstverständnis und Führungskultur, Zentrale 
Dienstvorschrift, Bundesministerium der Vertiedigung, A-2600/1 and Bundeswehr, available at 
https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/streitkraefte/grundlagen/innere_fuehrung/!ut/p/z1/04_
Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MQgKcXQw8fY2dnAwDjYwsnE30wwkpiAJKG
-AAjgb6wSmp-pFAM8xxmRESaqIfrB-lH5WVWJZYoVeQX1SSk1qil5gMcqF-ZEZiXkpOakB-
siNEoCA3otyg3FERAFlobJ4!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TPCD0IM3BB1Q2
2TU4. 
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what rules are about. As noted above, the reason for rules is to guide 
activities, and procedural rules are those essential directives. The other two 
sub-categories define the terms and the realm of efficacy of rules 
(compositional rules), or assign outcomes when rules are fulfilled or 
violated (consequential rules). The acts themselves are recorded in 
procedural rules. The word “procedural” might suggest some ordinal order 
to actions, but procedural rules are not limited to such regimented steps. 
The acts that lead a batter to strike out are no less procedural than the rules 
that define what comes with a successful hit. 
Rules differ in their complexity from directions or mechanical 
operations. Directions, whether advisory or mandatory, are sheerly 
practical. No norms of behavior come into play.  How one assembles an 
Ikea bookshelf is not a matter of rules—a person may do whatever he or 
she chooses without committing a violation—but one ignores the 
directions at one’s peril. On the other hand, if there is more than one way 
to construct the bookshelf, then so be it. No one route to assembly is 
favored over, nor is the effort to complete the bookshelf subject to the 
oversight of an authority. While the “rules of the road” in driving are 
practical procedural rules/laws, based on empirical concerns about safety, 
they are rules all the same. Nothing physical keeps a driver within the 
speed limit. To the contrary, the limits exist because cars can exceed them. 
In contrast, shifting gears is a mechanical process. It is either done 
correctly or the vehicle does not function (for long). Transmissions are 
human designs, and thus are similar to rules. However, they were devised 
to accomplish a practical task, not to channel behavior, and for this reason 
their operation is not described as rule-based. Procedural rules concern the 
steps prescribed for a desired behavior. 
The third main sub-category of rules is “consequential rules.”  These 
set out the results of compliance with, and violations of, the procedural 
and compositional rules. There are three main kinds or levels of 
consequential rules. The first, one might say, the most immediate, type of 
consequential rules are those that are closely connected to procedural 
rules. These are “inherent consequential rules.”  They determine the direct 
consequences of the completion of a single procedural rule. The 
procedural rule of rolling dice during one’s turn has the inherent 
consequence of some further action (procedure) in response to the result of 
the toss. One moves a piece on the board by the number of spaces that 
corresponds to the number on the upper surface of the dice. 
The second type of consequential rule is also linked with procedural 
rules. These are the “outcome consequential rules.” If one does an action 
based on the number that appears on the dice, that action then corresponds 
both to a next move (an imminent consequential rule) and also to a result, 
or an “outcome consequential rule.” A player in Monopoly throws the dice 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018]                             RECONCILING THE RULES OF LAW                               87   
 
 
 
and moves her piece according to the number that comes up. That 
complete act leads to a result; her piece lands on a space and there is a 
consequence for this event. The player may have to pay someone rent, 
pick a card that might reward her or send her to jail, or she might earn 
money for passing “Go.” This type of consequential rule is not part of the 
chain of procedures, but is, rather, an outcome consequential rule. That is, 
it is not just a step in the chain of procedures. It has significance apart 
from the procedures.  
Outcome consequential rules take many forms. They often respond to 
permitted acts or events that are nevertheless not entirely predictable. In 
baseball, consistently strong hits will get people on base, just as a majority 
of voters will determine the result of the election. Committing a foul in 
soccer or basketball has a consequence, to the detriment of the side that 
caused the foul and the potential benefit of the opposing team. A person 
who receives a “green card” in the United States becomes eligible for 
citizenship. While the process to qualify for citizenship may be 
procedural, the result falls under the compositional rules of membership in 
the system of rules, here, the domestic laws of the United States. In a 
game, this may mean that players gain rewards, or pay penalties, when 
they complete certain rule-prescribed acts. In legal systems, the 
consequential rules exist more in the background. There are commonly no 
consequences if one abides by the law other than successful continuation 
of one’s social activities. Winning or losing a game is defined by the 
procedural rules in conjunction with the procedurally-imminent 
consequential rules.   
Not every procedure must result in an apparent consequence. Driving 
correctly produces no awards other than the safe completion of the trip, 
and the avoidance of a penalty for improper driving. The positive 
consequence is inherent in the successful completion of the procedural 
rules; the negative is a ticket or worse. All these consequences are closely 
tied to the procedural rules because they are not ultimate, determinative 
outcomes.  They may well be negative or positive in their value to the 
participants, depending on the status—the team membership, say—of the 
participant. But they all come about within the bounds of the rules system. 
The third type of consequential rule is the one we are most concerned 
with here. The first two types we reviewed are part of the routine operation 
of the system of rules. The third type, in contrast, defines response to 
violations of the rules or to acts that are otherwise outside the usual rules.  
This kind of consequential rule, which I will call consequential rules of 
violation, or “violation rules” for short, is often disciplinary and punitive. 
Violation rules themselves break down into two main forms.  The milder 
type is an “adjustment violation rule,” such as a foul or penalty shot in 
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soccer, or remedies in contract law.  These rules redress infractions that 
occurred in the process of procedural rules.  They are punitive to a degree, 
but their central purpose is to be compensatory.  They make up for an 
improper transgression of a rule by transferring the gain to the injured 
party that was wrongly obtained by another party. 
The other version of violation rules is more pronouncedly punitive.  
Punitive violation rules are intended to censure an offending party.  They 
may include a corrective element, similar to adjustment violation rules, but 
their real purpose is the radical extirpation or isolation of the disruptive 
actor.  Punitive violation rules are still contained within a system of rules; 
what distinguishes them is that they come into play when someone 
covered by the rules behaves in a manner that crosses the norms of 
association that govern participants in the rules system. 
Punitive violation rules serve to prevent and to deter continued 
violations. They may, in addition, serve to educate the violators about the 
rules by impressing on them how important conformity with certain rules 
is. The more earnest instances of violation rules in sports manifest 
themselves as responses to cheating or abusive disregard of the 
compositional and procedural rules. Players are stringently penalized or 
barred from participation for a period.  Sweeping pieces off a chessboard 
out of anger lies outside the range of the procedural rules of the game and 
is, furthermore, an offense against the compositional rule of decorous play. 
Outside of the context of the chess game, the act would not be especially 
disturbing. Within the world of the game, however, it is destructive. The 
chess player who destroys the game is likely to be banned from further 
play with the other participants. 
Both forms of violation rules share some functions in systems of rules. 
Violation rules also fulfill an informational role in relation to both 
compositional and procedural rules by clarifying the import of those rules. 
A participant in a rules system may wonder what would happen if he or 
she deviated from a certain rule or rejected it outright. Consequential rules 
indicate what the cost is, if any, to ignoring or violating a compositional or 
procedural rule. Consequential rules indicate the importance of complying 
with it.31 
All consequential rules, including violation rules, operate according to 
their own internal procedural rules. Violations of the rules activate the 
 
 
  31.      Crimes imply the laws that should be followed by indicating those acts that a person 
should not do. This may be obvious, but criminal law does present a twist on the usual notion of 
procedural rules. One could think that, given the way criminal statutes are typically drafted, one fulfills 
them by doing the criminal act, and the “reward” for completing the rule is, perversely, punishment.  
This is a result of the manner in which criminal laws are often drafted—they are independent 
proscriptions rather than appendices to legal prescriptions of how one should or may legally behave. 
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consequential rules of enforcement. Rules of enforcement come into effect 
when a participant in the rule-system transgresses a rule. The most 
obvious incarnation of consequential rules as laws are criminal laws. 
Criminal laws define acts that the state has deemed so destructive or 
offensive as to warrant more active state enforcement and more drastic 
penalties. The rules of criminal procedure, in turn, set the procedural rules 
for the enforcement of the consequential criminal laws. 
In theory, systems of rules could consist of just the two categories, 
compositional and procedural rules. These two types tell all one needs to 
know in order to abide by a rules system. Consequential rules play two 
crucial roles for rules systems, however. First, they inform all those 
engaged with the rules about what they should do, or what they will see 
occur, when anyone violates the rules (whether intentionally or not).  
Otherwise people would be at a loss when they encountered infractions of 
rules. Second, consequential rules reinforce the integrity of rules systems. 
In some rules systems, the consequences of rule violations are mild—
trivial to invisible. Disregard of rules may only result in confusion and 
self-exemption. In the case of language, for example, one either speaks a 
language according to its rules, or one does not communicate.32 The 
“offender” isolates himself.  In a different kind of rules system, such as a 
competitive game or sport, a person can gain an unfair, surreptitious 
advantage if he or she successfully “games” the rules, that is, purposely 
circumvents or evades them. Rules are, after all, regulators of social 
behavior, and sometimes people better themselves at the expense of others 
by scorning the rules. Thus, consequential rules reinforce the authority of 
the rules systems by prospectively making such efforts costly. They are 
the porcupine’s quills of the rules systems, impressing on transgressors the 
importance of cleaving to the rules. 
  
 
 
  32.      An exception, as is often the case in the world of rules, is the rules of language. An 
organic system of rules does not include an authority. At most, there are overseers who work to 
standardize and perhaps protect the “integrity” of the language, but they have no enforcement authority 
over the participants in the rules system.   Individual fora, such as publishers of written materials, can 
control language use, but, again, these are sub-groups. The fundamental rules of language are 
inherited.  (Invented languages are no exception; no one can make someone who uses Esperanto 
comply with its rules, be they syntactical, semantic, or orthographic.) The only consequential rules of 
language are incomprehension and the failure to communicate. 
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B.   Rights as Rules 
Within a legal system that incorporates rights, rights are one type of 
normative compositional rules. 33  They are principles that are incorporated 
into the express compositional rules of the law and they help establish the 
foundation for procedural and consequential laws. Rights are legal 
permissions and protections for those who are included under the 
substantive compositional laws of membership and jurisdiction of a 
particular legal and political entity. Rights are the legal embodiment of the 
principles that people ought to be able to exercise certain abilities and 
potentialities, interests other principles. Rights bind the state and residents 
to protect and promote those legally acknowledged abilities and interests. 
Rights come about when those who have the power to create or to 
amend the legal system choose to incorporate them among the system’s 
compositional rules. In so doing, they solidify the status of the selected 
principles (principles favoring the free pursuit of various abilities, 
interests, and potentialities). Societies establish rights as normative 
compositional laws to ensure their availability as a legal resource for those 
to whom they are attributed. People who know that they have rights can 
turn to those rights to protect their interests. They are not dependent on 
other authorities, as determined by compositional rules, to determine 
whether they are protected under particular principles and norms. By 
incorporating these principles into compositional rules in a legal system, 
people are less dependent on the interpretative or adjudicative authority of 
officials designated the same compositional rules. 
Rights are an unusual form of compositional rules. Compositional 
rules either indicate who is eligible to participate or stipulate to whom they 
apply, regardless whether they are voluntary participants. Rights are a 
peculiarly self-referential type of compositional rule, for they protect the 
participants within the rules system, to some extent, from the creation or 
interpretation of rules that are offensive or biased. In most rules systems, 
one is either permitted or compelled to play along. Because the law is a 
one of the most profound forms of rule systems, legal systems often 
include rules that offer an enhanced regard to the affected population. 
Hence the people who live under a rights-incorporating legal-system 
have a right to their rights. This may appear to be a tautology but it is 
actually a crucial point: people endowed with rights are able legally to lay 
a claim on the state for the enforcement of their rights. They may pursue 
their rights through the civil judicial system, where they can seek legal 
 
 
 33. Legal systems need not, by definition, include explicit or even implicit rights. While they 
inhere to some minimal extent in every democracy, other political formations, such as autocracies, 
dispense with stable rights—with the exception, perhaps, of the rights of power of the rulers. 
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redress for offenses against their rights through the state’s police powers. 
A fundamental example of the right to rights is due process and access to 
the law. 
The term “subjective rights” is sometimes used for those rights that 
individuals can lay claim to in relation to the state or to one another.34 The 
party subject to the claim has a duty to the claimant who (correctly) 
protests a transgression of his or her rights. These individual claims 
inevitably produce rights conflicts between claimants, which thus 
necessitate their own rules for resolution.35 However, the term “claim” 
does not accurately characterize rights as principles incorporated into the 
law. As normative compositional laws, rights stipulate rules that the state 
or the society are legally bound to regard. Rights are not claims in 
themselves; rather, they are legally described conditions, abilities, 
possibilities, that can be the basis for claims. They therefore precede 
claims. A claim for the fulfillment of a right arises only insofar as others 
fail to attend to them or interfere with them. The legal “duty” of the state 
or other individuals to take a person’s claims against their rights into 
account is not so much a duty, as in a moral obligation, as it is a legally-
mandated action. These actions include the responsibility of the state to 
provide for people’s rights or, depending on the right, to refrain from 
infringing on them.  Rights form the legal counterpart to a moral 
injunction that we take care of one another or that we leave people be. 
Some rights block out an area for state-guaranteed individual expansion 
and expression, while others require the state to more actively to provide 
goods and services to people. 
Rights are not limited to establishing legal preservation of natural 
human abilities, interests, and so forth. They can also be engendered by 
procedural and consequential laws. In a democracy, people have the right 
(in theory) to determine the manner in which they are governed. They 
choose their lawmakers, and, whether through representational 
government or referenda, they have the right to set the laws that govern 
them. Voting is a right that derives from a legally-instituted ability and 
interest in a democratic society. The legal system itself, in short, can 
manifest new rights. The members of a rights-based society have a right to 
the enforcement of compositional laws, such as their rights, as well as to 
procedural and consequential laws. That is, people have a right to have 
 
 
 34. I make the distinction here between “state” and “population” to allow for those occasions 
when rights are enforceable only in relation to impeding state action. These arise where the rights have 
been so codified or interpreted as being limited to conflicts between individuals and state laws. 
 35. See Eric Mack, Elbow Room for Rights, in I OXFORD STUDIES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
194 (David Sobel, Peter Valentine & Steven Wall, eds., 2015). 
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laws passed and enforced. And they have a right to have laws that promote 
their rights, in other words, that fulfill the compositional rules of rights. 
Whereas in a game a single player has no recourse other than to object or 
leave when other players violate the rules, in a rights-based civil society, 
an aggrieved person has the right to appeal to the judicial authority of the 
state. As a person covered under the society’s compositional laws, he or 
she shares in the society’s full collection of rights. 
Just as rights can be added to a society’s laws, there are various means 
of instituting new rights: popular referenda, legislative agreement, or 
judicial holdings. But rights can also can also be expanded or contracted 
through legal (possibly starting out as popular) interpretation of extant 
laws. Typically, rights are developed through legal interpretation either 
when groups advocate for a broader reading of extant rights or when 
circumstances, such as changes in social mores, technological advances, or 
the gain or decline in important resources opens new ground for possible 
rights. 
C.   The Limitations of Rules and the Boundaries of Rights 
Rules are not self-enforcing. There is no such thing within the 
definition of rules as an overarching “rule of inviolability” that prevents 
rules within a system of rules from being self-contradictory. Rules can be 
nullified or illogically reinterpreted by other rules within the same system. 
This holds true for each of the three component categories of rules; all 
rules are vulnerable to being disregarded or violated. While consequential 
rules steer participants along the path of rule compliance, they, too, exist 
within a system of rules. Consequential rules do not automatically activate 
but rather depend on participants for their enforcement. Enforcement, in 
turn, is only effective if it can reach those who have violated the rules. If 
players in a game agree to ignore a rule of the game, and not even to 
bother with an extant process of formal amendment, they can do so. In an 
individual player decides to depart from the game before it is finished, 
effectively destroying the game for all the other players, he can. He 
unilaterally is able to escape the ligature of all the rules, and is subject, at 
most, to the censure of his fellows. The successful criminal fugitive lives 
untouched (albeit perhaps at the cost of constant circumspection) by 
society’s criminal laws. Why, then, do we even have rules if they 
presuppose agreement?  Are rules not afflicted by a circularity—rules bind 
people only where people have already agreed to be bound by the rules, 
but they will only agree if they already know the rules? 
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The Supremacy Clause36 in the United States Constitution is an 
example of such pre-existent agreement on which rules depend. Had those 
present at the Constitutional Convention, representing their states, not 
accepted that the Constitution would prevail over states’ laws in the areas 
in which it had annunciated its jurisdiction, the clause itself would have 
been hollow.  The signers of the Constitution were respectively authorized 
by their states to accede to the primacy national laws of the national over 
those of the constituent states.37 The states had thus already conceded that 
their rules could be superseded by another, recognized, system of rules. 
Rules may well be inconsistent, whether within a given system of rules, or 
across systems that relate to one another. But where these discrepancies 
occur, there must either be rules for resolving the conflicts, or the rules are 
ineffective. 
Where there is consensus about a particular practice, rules are useful 
because they clarify just what the accepted steps and boundaries are. Rules 
are nothing more than normatively tautological; they direct participants to 
do what the participants have already united, or been assigned, to do. 
Rules assume some fundamental consensus. What they add is not so much 
authority as definition and clarity. They give direction and specificity to 
acts, thereby helping participants to know what is to be done in what 
manner, by whom, and when. In addition, rules lay out procedures for 
reconciling disagreements. Rules can help prevent or resolve conflicts 
because they inform participants about what they have agreed to. They 
form a record of reference. In order to counteract disregard of rules, 
however, systems of rules require rules of enforcement. 
Another limitation of rules is that, for all that they establish order, they 
may not be rational, or fair, or transparent to all.  Some rules may invest 
certain players with discretionary powers that enable them to predominate 
over predictability and equitable treatment. One of the standard normative 
compositional rules underlying the rule of law is that fairness and 
transparency should control the formation and exercise of procedural and 
consequential rules. Consequential rules have a relationship with 
procedural and compositional rules. Consequences in a game do not 
happen haphazardly (unless the consequential rules of the game allow for 
some randomness). In the context of law, if a person pays her taxes 
correctly and on time, as the law requires, she should not be subjected to a 
penalty for dilatory payment. 
 
 
           36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2. 
 37. See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & KIM S. RICE, ARE WE TO BE A NATION? 171 (1987); 
JOYCE APPLEBY, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE: THE HEIRS AND THE DISINHERITED, IN THE 
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 146 (David P. Thelen, ed., 1988). 
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 One of the most famous challenges to Hart’s argument comparing laws 
to rules was posed by Ronald Dworkin. He did not entirely eschew the 
comparison, but rather found it to be insufficient. Rules were an 
inadequate description of how law functions, he argued, because they are 
too structured and too inflexible, to account for judicial deliberation.38 
When competent judges decide cases, they are doing more than following 
statutes or rules laid down through precedent. Instead, they draw, as 
necessary, on social values and principles that may well lie outside the 
corpus of legal statutes and precedent.39  
Dworkin’s conception of rules is drastically underdeveloped. Rules are 
not the rigid, limited propositions that Dworkin presents. In rules systems, 
compositional rules house the rules of interpretation for rules. These rules 
of interpretation include the methods and sources that participants in the 
rule system may resort to in order to interpret rule in all three 
subcategories of rules. For example, interpretative compositional rules 
determine the resources that may be used to understand rules. They also 
define who has the authority to interpret the rules, and whether there is 
more than one authority, and thus who adjudicates conflicts in 
interpretations. For example, the Bible has been interpreted differently by 
different religious traditions, all of which revere it as their primary source 
for moral and even legal guidance. Yet not only have these diverse 
religions diverged some in their recognized biblical canons, but they have 
each exercised multiple, parallel rules of scriptural interpretation.40 Secular 
legal systems similarly have established rules of statutory interpretation of 
which judges must be cognizant.41 Where there is no rule to be found 
concerning an interpretative issue, though, other compositional rules may 
fill in the blanks. Thus, if judges are considered ultimate arbiters in legal 
questions, then they could argue that they have the legal power to choose 
how to interpret legal texts in the absence of more definite hermeneutics. 
Therefore, Dworkin’s herculean judges who masterfully weave 
together precedent and principles are not actually arguing from “extra-
legal” principles.42 Rather, these able judges are following the legal 
system’s compositional rules of interpretation, which recognize the 
propriety of principled argument in legal decisions, particularly when the 
 
 
 38. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–24 (1978). 
           39. See id. at 26–39, 82–130. 
           40. See, e.g., STEVEN OZMENT, THE AGE OF REFORM: 1250-1550: AN INTELLECTUAL AND 
RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF LATE MEDIEVAL AND REFORMATION EUROPE 63–73 (1980); JAMES L. 
KUGEL, THE BIBLE AS IT WAS 1–36 (1997). 
 41. See, e.g., HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 22, at 97; SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra 
note 28, at 83. 
          42. See DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 105–10. 
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principles considered are familiar within the law.43 Were that not the case, 
the judges’ holdings would be invalid, for they would be transgressing the 
rules of proper adjudication by calling on principles. They are only able to 
do so because the law permits them to.44 The legal system’s compositional 
rules of interpretation acknowledge—indeed, may encourage—judges to 
rely on their notions of shared principles of justice when considering 
cases. In Dworkin’s world, judges may resort to principles because the 
law’s compositional rules of interpretation allow them this latitude. 
Dworkin is incorrect when he concludes that judges must at times reach 
beyond precedent or even precise statutory phrasing to reach holdings that 
are consistent with the law. Judges can do so where the law’s rules permit 
them a heterogeneous set of sources, including concepts that are immanent 
in the law but not explicitly codified.45 
The uncertainties inherent in rules systems are consequential for legal 
systems. They are most acute in criminal punishment. Where a legal 
system is based on rights, it might seem logically inconsistent for the legal 
consequences of criminal violations to contradict the system’s 
foundational principles of rights. But what is to prevent such conflicts 
among laws? And why should a society care about whether its sentencing 
practices take rights into account? As our current practice of punishment 
shows, the majority of us can blithely live with seriously discrepant laws, 
suffering little personal impingement on our activities. Few of us are 
affected by criminal sentencing guidelines and court orders that do not 
wrestle with the conflict between criminal punishment and rights. Rules 
are enforced only insofar as there is a means for enforcing them, or an 
interest in abiding by them. If neither the authorities (the checks and 
balances between branches of government do not demand rule conformity) 
nor the population (the ultimate arbiters in a democracy) are concerned to 
follow the laws, then what logically requires conformity with them? 
 
 
 43. Id. at 23–26. 
 44. Robert Alexy, who is strongly influenced by Dworkin, has systematized the relationship 
between rules and principles to such a degree that principles become combined with rules. In so doing, 
Alexy unwittingly sets forth rules for interpreting principles. See ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER 
GRUNDRECHTE (1994). 
       45.   Sometimes the rules of interpretation appear to be left to procedural rules, rather than 
compositional rules. For instance, rather than incorporating a set of principles among the normative 
compositional rules that judges then use when weighing disputes, voters would choose what legal 
safeguards and benefits they have, and could change these “popular” rights with each election cycle. 
The hazard of leaving compositional elements to be resolved through procedural rules is that it lacks 
an enduring ratification of fundamental principles. A majority of the voting population could simply 
ignore the interests and abilities of a minority and leave them with no rights. It is the nature of 
procedural rules that they are not value bound, for any values and principles in a rules system are 
instituted as compositional rules. Any changes to compositional rules must themselves be guided by 
consistent procedural rules; otherwise, compositional and procedural rules would be unsynchronized. 
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As we observed earlier, there exists no overriding rule of inviolability 
that prevents systems of rules from being internally contradictory. No rule 
alone can compel those who are defined by the rules as subject to the rules 
to obey the rules. If rules were invulnerable to being violated, there would, 
after all, be no crimes. Indeed, there might be no need for rules, for they 
would simply be facts, like the laws of nature. Rules obtain only insofar as 
people chose to act in accordance with them. And this principle applies no 
less to people’s decision to change or challenge rules; they assert 
themselves either in accordance with the procedural rules of change or 
they accept the consequential rules that come with civil disobedience. 
If the solution to insuring rule-conformity does not lie in some higher 
rule or some deontological authority, it must be found within the nature of 
rules and the norms that influence them. If a legal system incorporates 
certain elements within its compositional rules, such as the normative 
compositional rules of rights, then this system must also include a 
compositional rule so obvious that we might overlook it: rules should be 
followed by those who are covered by them.  If the legal system also 
includes other normative compositional particular to judicial practice such 
as fairness, due process, predictability, it is likewise committed under the 
compositional rule of internal consistency to creating and acting on 
procedural and consequential rules that are in keeping with these 
compositional rules. 
One might therefore suppose that a salient constraint governing any 
legal system is the logical "law" of the excluded middle.  Just as there 
cannot be within the same logical system both ‘p’ and ‘not-p,’ so too, 
should it be logically untenable for a legal system to include laws that are 
mutually contradictory. Where the state recognizes rights among its 
compositional rules, it cannot then deny them. As we will explore more 
extensively in the next section, criminal punishment flies in the face of this 
logical principle. Punishment interferes with rights in order to help 
preserve them. 
IV. CONTENTIOUS RELATIONS: RIGHTS AND PUNISHMENT 
A. Rights as Justification for Criminal Laws and Criminal Punishment 
 
Criminal law writ large falls into all three sub-categories of rules. 
Criminal statutes and common law crimes are the compositional laws that 
name and define those acts that are intolerable to the law. The laws of 
criminal procedure determine how criminal trials are to be conducted, 
along with the preparatory steps, such as arrest, pre-trial detention, the 
collection and storage of evidence, the use of grand juries, the 
safeguarding of rights of defendants and victims, and other steps. And the 
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laws of criminal enforcement, culminating in the laws of criminal 
punishment, are the consequential criminal laws that make criminal 
statutes effective. 
The state also has laws for the adjudication of civil conflicts and the 
imposition of corresponding consequential laws in the form of final 
judgments. Violations of civil laws, such as breaches of contract (private 
rule arrangements, the integrity of which, though, can be enforced through 
the law), or tortious acts. The offended parties may resort to laws to seek 
adjudication and remediation of the harm suffered. 
Most civil disputes do not convert to criminal violations.  They are, 
rather, resolved through civil remedies, which are a legal version of 
adjustment violation rules.  Contractual remedies, for instance, are court-
ordered arrangements (sometimes patterned on remedies that the parties 
expressly included in the contract) that set a substitute outcome for the 
obligations that would have been completed but for a breach.  Some 
criminal laws are contiguous with specific civil procedural laws.  For 
example, in the case of tax laws, intentional failure to file taxes, as 
required by law, can result in the crime of tax evasion.  The crimes exist in 
conjunction with the legal duties established through civil laws.   
In contrast, transgressions of criminal laws trigger legal penalties that 
go beyond just an equitable resolution to a wrong.  Just as the criminal law 
that was violated incorporated a moral view of acceptable versus 
intolerable acts, so, too, does the punitive violation law of legal 
punishment represent a society's moral outrage at the criminal infraction.  
Punitive violation rules, in the form of criminal punishment, have the 
function of condemning a harm or an injustice that cannot be satisfactorily 
rectified through an exchange between the criminal and the victim.  As we 
noted earlier, not all rules systems require violation rules.  All the more is 
this true in the case of punitive violation rules.  Punishment is applied 
when the insult to the rules cuts to the bone of values, and injures the 
morals, even the welfare, of the participants. 
Not all crimes expressly pertain to compositional laws.  For instance, 
the Bill of Rights, does not mention a right to bodily integrity, yet murder, 
rape, criminal assault, and battery—all crimes that directly harm the 
physical (and psychological) welfare of a person—are standard crimes 
among the states and have not been found to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution.  Or consider the difference between embezzlement and theft.  
Embezzlement is the taking, through fraud, of another person’s personal 
property with which one has been entrusted.  As such, it is a violation of a 
legal duty to safeguard someone else’s property.  Theft, in contrast, has no 
positive legal counterpart in the form of a specific duty, but is simply a 
violation of the law against improperly taking property.  None of these 
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common crimes is a transgression against an explicit right. 
One of the reasons for criminal laws and laws of criminal punishment 
is to counter offenses against rights. Without criminal laws, the state, 
which exists in good part to support and protect its people and to preserve 
their rights, would lack a major means to safeguard those rights.46 
Punishment also meets a deep need of victims, and indeed of society at 
large, to see that crimes are not ignored and forgotten, yet at the same time 
are not left to vigilante actions. This need is enormously widespread. We 
often speak of “getting justice” when what we expect is not restitution but 
some kind of vengeance. The state can subsume and conduct the impulse 
for retribution, but it cannot deny it.  Punishment is a crucial device for 
preserving rights.47 
In the absence of the laws of criminal enforcement and criminal 
punishment, the criminal law would be but an ineffective assemblage of 
recommendations and nomenclature.  The practice of criminal punishment 
gives force to criminal laws. Criminal laws define and proscribe; criminal 
punishment realizes these definitions and proscriptions. Were there no 
punishments, criminal laws would be nothing more than expressions of 
opprobrium, lacking clout and seriousness. Criminal punishments are the 
consequential laws that realize the prohibitions defined in criminal laws. 
As with all consequential rules, the laws of criminal punishment 
contain their own procedural laws controlling how punishment is to be 
carried out. These procedural laws are variously precise or broad, and are 
subject to both statute and judicial discretion. 48 
Just as criminal laws exist to protect the integrity of other laws, so, too, 
do they define these laws’ boundaries. That is especially evident in the 
case of rights. The contours of what rights allow are set by criminal 
statutes. Rights have the potential constantly to come into conflict. One 
person’s indulgence in his free expression can drown out the voice of 
others. The landlord who owns tracts of apartment buildings and declines 
to spend his money on their upkeep leaves his tenants in dreadful housing 
or compels them to spend their funds on improving his real estate. By 
restricting certain actions that are iniquitous to rights, the corpus of 
criminal laws helps to define rights. Where the law recognizes a right to 
 
 
 46. Even those who speculate about abandoning punishment admittedly find their proposals 
more palatable for material crimes, such as theft or bribery, as opposed to more impulsive and violent 
crimes. See DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 237 (2008); see also Stephen P. Garvey, 
Alternatives to Punishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (John 
Deigh & David Dolinko, eds., 2011). 
 47. There is an extensive literature discussing the importance of the threat of punishment, as 
distinct from the actual punishment. See e.g., Warren Quinn, The Right to Threaten and the Right to 
Punish, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 4 (1985). 
          48.      See Benjamin L. Apt, Do We Know How to Punish?, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 437 (2016). 
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obtain property, for instance, it forms a legal protection around people’s 
interest in holding possessions free of manipulation or occupation by 
others. The laws proscribing theft restrict the ability of people to take 
possession of property, yet we would not speak of these laws as inimical 
to the right to own property right. Rather, these criminal laws are essential 
to protect the legally recognized ability to obtain and keep property. 
The criminal laws barring theft refine the right to exercise the ability to 
acquire property.  In so doing, the criminal laws protect the right of 
property by helping to mark off its borders. Criminal law limits some 
actions for the sake of preserving others. It can do this without 
consequently intruding on rights because rights, too, are laws, not mere 
concepts. Rights are not wholesale safeguards of abilities and interests. 
They are not infinite, unfettered allowances for acting on abilities and 
interests. Indeed, rights could not feasibly be unrestricted, for they would 
then inevitably collide. 
Rights could conceivably be drafted with the internal explicit 
provisions that moderate the exercise of abilities and the satisfaction of 
interests so that people do not cause harm to one another in the enjoyment 
of their rights. The law usually tempers rights from without, however, by 
designating acts that are beyond the pale. The advantage of this 
arrangement is that it does not prematurely retard the definition of rights. 
Instead, it compels a society to be aware of every occasion, every law, 
through which it constrains a right. The underlying legal basis for limiting 
rights resides in another normative compositional rule, which is that law 
social coexistence must sometimes prevail over individual use of rights. 
The compositional laws that endow authorities (or, possibly, the public) 
the power to create and interpret laws (including such compositional laws 
as rights), include laws that permit these authorities to laws that define and 
delimit rights. 
 
B.   Criminal Laws and Criminal Punishment as a Threat to Rights 
 
The challenge in drafting criminal laws is that they can carve too 
deeply into the territory of rights. A classic contemporary example is the 
criminal definition of hate speech.  The potential for conflicts with rights is 
magnified by criminal punishment laws. Criminal statutes must balance 
restrictions on rights in favor of protecting compositional laws, among 
them rights. The effort can easily go awry, resulting in laws, including 
criminal laws that impinge too heavily on rights. Yet, in the United States, 
at least, there are no criminal provisions prohibiting the passage of laws 
that are heavily antagonistic to rights. The only processes available to 
counteract laws that hurt rights lie with the political process or (assuming 
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one can establish standing) the pursuit of legal complaints through the 
judicial system. Both routes are uncertain and laborious and above all 
retroactive.  
Punishment by its nature, restricts rights, and cuts against the norms 
that underlie them. Punishment would not be punishing were it not to 
impose a negative circumstance on someone who has violated a criminal 
law (a law meant to protect a norm). That the state applies punishment to 
some people for the sake of others, that it may properly punish only those 
who have themselves affronted laws, does not vanquish the paradox of 
punishment.  Nor does it suffice to characterize punishment as some sort 
of boundary condition of rights, defining them by delimiting them.  
Punishment is justifiable practiced so long as it is believed to be necessary 
to shore up the law, to protect rights.  But that does not extinguish the fact 
that punishment impinges on rights. 
Criminal punishment nearly invariably entails reductions in rights. 
Where criminal statutes essentially say, “Take care you do not do X, for 
that would be damaging to others and would violate their rights,” criminal 
punishment promises, at the very least, that, “Because you did X, you will 
lose the opportunity for some time to use some of your rights.” Direct 
physical punishments, most glaringly, executions, affect any rights 
involving bodily integrity, those, that is, that protect abilities to use the 
body as one wishes, as well as the interests one has in not being harmed. 
Almost all punishments, though, have some bearing on a person’s physical 
wellbeing. Incarcerating limits where one may go and what one may do in 
the world. It also exposes people to the dangers of prison, an aspect that is 
not officially condoned as a punishment, but that is so usual that it 
becomes inherent in the penalty. Milder restrictions, from being required 
wearing a leg bracelet to reporting regularly to a parole officer, hinder a 
person’s rights by inserting state-ordered intrusions into one’s daily 
affairs. 
It is therefore essential that the laws of criminal punishment be devised 
with a constant awareness that they exist within the legal system.  The 
temptation can be all too strong, among the public, politicians, and judges, 
to see criminal sentences slip the reins of compositional laws because they 
are a reaction to often disturbing, inhumane behavior.  Where rights exist 
among the compositional laws of a legal system, they cannot be vaporized 
elsewhere within that system.  If criminal punishment is to remain 
consistent with such compositional laws as rights then the laws of 
punishment must be subject to justificatory rules that rationally delineate 
how, and how much, punishment may delimit rights.  A first step toward 
addressing this task is to be conscious that legal punishments exist within 
a legal system oriented around rights. 
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Legal systems that incorporate rights, however, are constrained in the 
range of punitive violation laws.   For one, they cannot punish a person in 
a fashion that directly contradicts the rights the legal system grants.  To do 
so would set up a contradiction between compositional rules (rights) and 
violation rules, where the latter ignore the former.  Rights preexist the 
people to whom they are attributed.  They are fundamental legal 
assumptions; they apply to people because they are.  Laws of punishment, 
in contrast, become activated because of what people do.  They cannot 
both retain the criminal within the jurisdiction of the legal system yet also 
deny the criminal recognized rights. 
The two most extreme possible punitive violation rules in any rules 
system are the ejection, through expulsion or alienation, or the destruction 
of a participant (and, possibly, the participant’s allies).49 The legal 
counterparts of these ultimate violation rules are banishment, either 
through exile or internal segregation from the population at large, or 
execution.  Exile is the last legal action of the legal system, for it declares 
that a participant is no longer welcome.  Execution, in contrast, holds the 
person within the law's realm, but only in order to annihilate him.  While 
such an outcome is not in itself rationally untenable in a rules systems, it is 
contradictory within a legal system that is founded on rights. While rights 
could be written in such a way that they exist or dissolve depending on a 
person’s actions, that condition would subject to whether the person 
continues as a member of the society or not.  So long as criminals remain 
legally-acknowledged members of the society, they have rights.  The 
puzzle is devising punishments, which will ineluctably minimize some 
rights, without instigating a contradiction. 
If a central purpose of punishment is that it expresses condemnation, 
then there may well be a correlation between the severity of a penalty and 
the crime for which it is inflicted.  Rights, as normative compositional 
rules, can be conditioned, but only through a reasonable argument that 
accounts for which rights are being suspended, and why, and for how long.  
This fundamental consistency within the body of laws is one of the tenets 
of state legitimacy: that the state, in its capacity as legislator, enforcer, and 
adjudicator, abides by the laws that create and instruct the state.50 
 
 
 49. These kinds of eliminative punitive violation rule can obtain in both voluntary and 
compulsory rules systems. Legal systems are a mix of voluntary and compulsory. They are voluntary 
in that people can choose to enter or leave the system, but they are also mandatory, for they are 
binding for those living within the system's jurisdiction. 
 50. For a thoughtful discussion of state legitimacy as critical condition for criminal 
punishment, see Alice Ristroph, Conditions of Legitimate Punishment, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 79 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins, eds., Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). 
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The very existence of crime might be taken as evidence that the state 
has not upheld its task of protecting rights. Perhaps the proper solution for 
the state is to do its utmost to protect rights preventively rather than 
waiting for violations. But deliberate prevention of crime would not 
resolve the paradox posed by criminal punishment; it would only shift it. 
For the more a state monitors its citizens’ actions in order to restrain them 
from possibly violating one another’s rights, the more it steps onto the 
rights of its people. 
None of the prevalent theories of punishment offers a good solution to 
this dilemma.51 None can rationally explain just which rights may be 
restricted, and to what extent, as the consequence for committing a crime. 
The argument for deterrence is concerned with discouraging future crimes. 
Rights do not figure into its rationale. The same is true for retributivism. 
Even in its arguably milder form of “limited retributivism,” the theory 
calls for punishment to be an adverse experience for the criminal and 
justifies it as an expression of social disapprobation. Arguments based on 
the notion of desert deem punishment as the due consequence to which a 
criminal exposes himself for engaging in his crime. We might expect that 
desert theory would have something to say about why specific crimes 
deserve specific reductions of particular rights, but that is not the theory’s 
preoccupation. Like retributivism, desert theory is not forward looking, 
with the aim of producing a reformed person, but looks only to what one 
has coming to him. Even reparative theories, such as rehabilitation and 
restorative justice, are grounded in the belief that the repentant criminal 
will suffer remorse and shame. Moreover, they, too, call for the state to 
take hold of the criminal’s life and to mandate that he undergo some 
process. 
This is all to say that punishment does not necessarily accomplish the 
effects that are—often with little evidence—attributed to it. For all the 
empirical insufficiencies and theoretical speculations behind most theories 
of punishment, it is hard to imagine that a society could dispense with it. 
Criminals need to know that they cannot commit crimes with impunity, 
victims necessitate some kind demonstration of society’s solidarity with 
them and regret for their pain, and the public at large demands that the 
state will take measures to protect it from being ravished by those of ill 
will. 
 
  
 
 
           51. See Apt, supra note 48, at 438–39. 
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IV. FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS 
 
One particularly pernicious proposition put forward that intersects with 
criminal punishment is that criminals “forfeit” their rights through their 
illegal acts. At root, the rationale behind rights forfeiture is that the 
criminal loses some, or possibly all, of his own rights, because he 
intentionally scorned both the rights of others and, still worse, the very 
legal system that grants him his rights. His defiant actions thus dissolve his 
moral and legal standing to claim rights.52 As a result of losing its trust in 
him, the society banishes the criminal to an inner exile, where he lives 
without legal protections and at the mercy of a society that sees him of 
diminished worth. 
Christopher Heath Wellman, a contemporary proponent of the rights 
forfeiture view, notes that rights are forfeited in order to make punishment 
permissible.  Rather, forfeiture simply happens as a result of an actor's 
misdeeds. However, this change is necessary is punishment is to be 
justifiable.53 Whether this drastic status comes about by legal decree or 
some sort of moral/legal metaphysics is not clear.  Regardless, he 
somehow knows that rights evaporate upon the commission of--or perhaps 
only after the conviction for—a crime. 
Wellman further observes that, just because rights forfeiture is a 
precondition for punishment, that by no means entails that punishment will 
occur.54  He neglects to acknowledge that losing the legal security of 
rights, however, is itself a form of punishment.55  Rights forfeiture exposes 
the subject to the unchecked wrath of society, whether in the form of 
vigilantism or state penalization.  And punishment invariably follows: the 
wrongdoer, left out in the open without normal legal protections, will not 
be charitably ignored.  So, while forfeiture arguments may not themselves 
prescribe punishments (beyond the dissolution of rights), they cannot 
decently maintain that questions of criminal punishment lie beyond their 
concern. One dilemma for the advocates of rights forfeiture is how to 
explain which rights are forfeited for which crimes: does the commission 
 
 
 52. For the moral standing argument, see Christopher W. Morris, Punishment and the Loss of 
Moral Standing, 21 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 53 (1991). 
 53. See Christopher Heath Wellman, The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment, 122 
ETHICS 371, 372, 378  (2012). 
 54. Wellman repeatedly says that rights forfeiture goes the question of the permissibility of 
punishment. He is careful to distinguish rights forfeiture from a theory of punishment, i.e., an 
argument for why punishment should occur. Id. at 371–72, 375. 
 55. In his treatment of rights forfeiture as a nearly natural result, Wellman holds that rights 
forfeiture is a necessary presupposition for the justification of criminal punishment.  However, certain 
that he is that rights vanish, or at least diminish, with the criminal act, he does not consider their loss to 
be punishment in itself.  Id. at 374. 
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of a crime, or a crime of a specified severity, result in the forfeiture of all 
of the criminal’s rights, or only those that he violated (his victim’s), or 
only those that he abused in doing his crime (his own)? 56     Does a 
murderer lose far more rights than a petty shoplifter because he took the 
life of his victim?  Does the murderer forfeit a right to his life, or at least 
the normal free enjoyment of it, because of his crime, whereas a 
shoplifter’s penalty is presumably much milder? The question of 
proportionality thus finds its way into rights forfeiture theory, albeit in 
singular, and still unsettled, form. 57 
Yet another set of problems facing rights-forfeiture is explaining the 
future legal status of the person who has forfeited his/her rights.  The loss 
of rights extends to sentencing and beyond, but how far?58 Wellman 
cannot say whether a criminal can be punished with no limit of severity or 
duration.59  He allows that the criminal falls into a vulnerable legal status 
because he/she can no longer claim his rights against injustices and errors 
by others.  One is left wondering how a criminal can even have a right of 
judicial appeal after being found guilty at trial. Wellman concedes that he 
has no firm stand on the question, whether only the government may 
punish, even execute the convicted, right-less criminal, or whether 
vigilante vengeance is just as permissible, given the criminal's drastic legal 
degradation.60 In sum, right forfeiture, as exemplified by Wellman's 
remarks, does not recognize reciprocal duties between society and the 
criminal. The righteousness of rights-forfeiture reflects a desolate social 
ethic.61  
In addition, committing criminal acts no more causes someone to 
forfeit his/her rights than does a person’s decision voluntarily to waive a 
right in a particular circumstance.  When one waives a right, one draws on 
one’s right to choose not to exploit a particular right (and some rights, in 
some systems, cannot be waived).  Waiving a right is provisional; it does 
not means that a person has surrendered—or even can surrender—that 
 
 
 56. The notion of rights forfeiture is hardly new. Mill, for one, raised it in Utilitarianism. For 
a recent defense of rights forfeiture, see Christopher Heath Wellman, Piercing Sovereignty: A 
Rationale for International Jurisdiction over Crimes that Do not Cross International Borders, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green, eds., 2011). 
 57. See Alm, supra note 13, at 104–05 n.3. 
           58. Lax limitations on punishment are already prevalent in contemporary American practice; 
adopting a cavalier rights-forfeiture position would exacerbate foul treatment of convicted criminals.  
Consider Michael Tonry, Making American Sentencing Just, Humane and Effective, 46 CRIME & JUST. 
441, 444 (2017). 
   59. Wellman, Rights Forfeiture Theory, supra note 53, at 386. 
 60. Id. at 378–79. 
 61. See Antje du Bois-Pedain, Punishment as an Inclusionary Practice, in CRIMINAL LAW 
AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 205 (Antje du Bois-Pedain, Magnus Uluaeng, & Petter Asp, eds., 
2017). 
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right entirely to another.  Rights persist as recognized laws.  A person 
cannot cause them to vanish, nor can the state insist that they have 
somehow been lost.  
Lowering in the background of the call for rights forfeiture is an 
invidious perception of the criminal as someone who has, by his acts, 
converted himself into an inferior being compared to law-abiding citizens. 
It views the commission of the criminal act as somehow capable of 
metamorphosing the criminal into a different ontological status: as a being 
who lacks the abilities, interests, or capacity for intentions of humans.62 
But if the criminal is, or becomes, intrinsically different from other people, 
in terms of rights, then we cannot speak of criminal culpability.  Rather, 
the criminal reveals himself to be something, perhaps to have been 
something all along, from a normal member of society.  Rights forfeiture 
needs to be upfront about this unsettling ontological distinction between 
people who have rights and those who, through any of a range of acts, do 
not. 
But ultimately the critical flaw of rights forfeiture is that it 
misunderstands what rights are. Rights are the tenets to which a legal 
system is committed.63  They cannot be unilaterally annulled or withdrawn 
by the state because part of the state’s very raison d’être is the preservation 
of rights.  Rights are not the possessions of the state, to be disposed of as 
the state sees fit, any more than they belong to the individual.  The 
compositional laws that establish the state endow it with the duty to 
preserve the law.  In those legal systems that recognize rights among their 
compositional laws, the state's mandate includes the protection of rights.64 
Norval Morris has observed that a victim whose rights are violated by a 
crime does not thereby lose those rights. The offense of the crime does not 
destroy the victim’s rights; it only infringes on them.65 A corollary of his 
argument is that the criminal’s rights, too, are not abolished by his actions. 
 
 
           62. See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-
GOVERNMENT 99–101 (2007). 
           63. Other theories of rights laid out in this article have also found the rights forfeiture 
position to be based in a flawed conception of rights. Id. at 98.   
 64. Here my position most bluntly diverges from Wellman's. In his counter-argument to what 
he calls the “problem of status,” Wellman writes: 
But notice: the rights forfeitures view need not contest that we qualify for moral rights in 
virtue of our status as human beings or rational/autonomous agents; it conflicts only with the 
view that we qualify for nonforefeitable rights in virtue of that status.  So the question is not 
whether we qualify for rights in virtue of our status, it is what type of right we qualify for as 
rational agents or human beings. 
Wellman, Right Forfeiture Theory, supra note 53, at 377.  Leaving aside whatever Wellman thinks he 
means by "moral rights," I argue that rights are legal rules that envelope those who live within a 
particular legal system, not attributes that come with condition of "status" of being human.  
           65. See Norval Morris, The Status of Rights, 92 ETHICS 40, 41–42 (1981). 
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Without question the two parties, perpetrator and victim, are very 
different: one has been harmed against his will, the other has purposely or 
recklessly caused the harm. They are alike, though, in relation to the legal 
permanence of their rights, for the existence of rights does not hinge on 
acts. They are presupposed legal principles binding the society. 
Incorporated in a legal system as fundamental legal principles, rights exist 
apart from the people who live within the legal system. True, a person may 
choose to act on his or her subjective rights, although a legal system may 
deny the legal ability for people to waive certain rights. But rights are the 
perduring substrate of the legal system. 
Rights pre-exist uniformly for all members as part of the society’s 
compositional laws, as some of the axioms of its legal system.  They 
pertain to a person until he or she decides to leave the region of legal 
jurisdiction.  And rights apply equally to each person because, as laws 
established for all of a society’s members, they precede individuals.  They 
thus set a margin, a buffer, shielding him or her from a degree of state 
intrusiveness.66 Because rights are foundational, compositional rules, they 
cannot be permanently revoked by the government.  Once created, rights 
perdure in their legal system.  They remain in existence except in the 
eventuality that the activities, the abilities and interests that underlie them, 
themselves disappear.  The history of the United States Constitution 
reveals the dangers to a nation’s population of misguidedly conditioning 
normative compositional laws according to such characteristics as sex or 
race that are irrelevant to the definition of rights.   
For all its deficiencies, though, the argument for rights forfeiture is 
correct on one central point.  If there is a place for criminal punishment in 
a rights-based legal system, indeed, if punishment serves to shore up 
rights, it is nevertheless only rationally permissible if rights are not 
absolute, but can be limited, conditioned.  As we noted earlier, a legal 
system can refine rights so as to exclude certain actions, just as it can 
condition them according to people's age, or mental capacity, or 
citizenship status.  Punishments must fit within the structure of these 
limitations on rights to form a seamless (as far as practicable) puzzle. 
 
  
 
 
 66. While Judith Jarvis Thomson does not reject the rights forfeiture position, she correctly 
warns that a government’s penal code must be consistent with the society’s formal rights (she also 
distinguishes between legal and moral rights; the differentiation misunderstands the function of rights 
as principles of a legal system that, in turn, enforces them). See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM 
OF RIGHTS 366 (1990). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
To help ensure that rights remain respected in society, they must rely, 
like all laws, on the specter of enforcement. While there is very good 
cause to question how the state accomplishes punishment, laws of 
enforcement are critical to binding people to compliance with legal 
systems. Participation in a system of rules, and conformity to the rules of 
the system, cannot be entirely voluntary, or rules would be merely 
equivalent to suggestions. 
When they are punished, criminals are not able to do some legal 
activities that were available them before they were arrested, tried, and 
sentenced. This is always the case, for rules of enforcement circumvent 
other rules. They limit the continued engagement of those who violate 
rules in the system of rules. Criminal laws and the consequent prescribed 
range of punishments may thus limit criminals’ association with others, or 
restraints on their ability for expression, or the exercise of any of a 
plenitude of other activities. In short, people subject to punishment have 
fewer opportunities to use those abilities and to pursue those interests that 
are instituted as rights. Yet how can this fact be reconciled with the 
existence of rights in the same legal system? 
Rights are not absolute allowances for acting on abilities and interests. 
They are normative compositional laws created as part of a society’s legal 
system to encourage and shield certain human proclivities. They guarantee 
liberties and invest the state and the population with duties over one 
another. But they are also circumscribed by that very society in which 
each person enjoys his or her rights. Rights are laws, whereas a society 
that allows unfettered actions is anarchic. The decision to create rights in 
the first place is a normative one, reflecting a confidence that the law and 
the state are the right instruments to order decent social behavior. That 
rights are necessarily limited in society is not, in itself, a contradiction. 
Other norms, such as those incorporated into criminal laws, ban acts that 
would otherwise cause harm. Certain applications of abilities, such as the 
ability to undertake raging violence, are precluded from normative 
compositional laws of rights because it is an abhorrent use of ability and 
reflects no socially tolerable interest. Criminal laws, including criminal 
punishment, exist to check activities—the use of abilities and the pursuit 
of interests—that lie outside the range of rights. 
Ideally, criminal laws are devised to be congruent with rights. They set 
the limits that make rights practicable within a society.  Criminal 
punishment, though, is a different animal from criminal law.   It is 
conceivable, but improbable, that criminal punishments could avoid 
trespassing on rights. That could only obtain where either the set of rights 
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recognized by the given legal system were already minimal or the nature 
of the punishment applied is nearly negligible. The potential for the logical 
contradiction between rights and effective criminal punishment cannot be 
entirely vanquished; it can only be reduced. 
 The indispensable utility of punishment notwithstanding, rights and 
punishment will never be entirely compatible. Criminal penalization is 
intended to do more than restore all the parties to their situations before 
the crime was committed.67 Punishment is not designed solely to achieve 
restitution, to repair the victim, alone.  It is not an equitable remedy in the 
fashion of a civil judgment that aims to set the victim right and to remove 
the offending party's unjust enrichment.  The peculiar purpose of 
punishment is to be punitive. Even those theories of punishment, such as 
rehabilitation, that seek humane ends for the criminal rather than sheer 
suffering and banishment, are punitive.  The criminal is not free to refuse 
rehabilitation and walk free.  He/she remains a charge of the state, and the 
state determines the degree of his/her freedom to exercise certain rights.  
Whether the rationale for the discomfort of criminal punishment is to turn 
the criminal toward regret, to scare him/her off from future crimes, to 
annunciate a society's collective dismay at the criminal's commission of 
immoral or repellant acts, or all of these reasons, the function of 
punishment is to seize the criminal perpetrator and to control his fate to 
some degree.  Even punishments that are not as severe as incarceration or 
bodily harm, such as fines, are driven by a purpose that is different from 
making the victim whole.  Fines subject the criminal to payments that are 
meant to be sufficiently costly to influence his behavior toward legal 
compliance.68 
Punishment cannot undo the irremediable damage of a crime.  This is 
most evident in instances of terrible crimes such as murder, maiming, rape 
and sexual abuse, physical and psychological torture.  Yet those crimes 
that do not cause permanent destruction likewise inflict harm on their 
victims and intrude on their rights.  The task of punitive violation laws is 
 
 
           67. Just restoration is a civil law solution to legal disagreement. It aims to make injured 
parties whole (as far as possible). Criminal penalties go further, motivated by a somewhat different 
notion, or, better "sense" of justice.  Punishments appear where society deems the legal violation to be 
morally offensives, malicious, and harmful. This distinction between adjustment violation laws and 
punitive violation laws has a long history. Consider, as just one instance, the complex debates over 
appropriation and recompense developed in the Bava Kamma, the Talmud's tractates on damages.  The 
material outcomes between a thief and his victim were extensive, yet also very different from the 
penalties for theft. 
           68. Theodore Blumoff’s trenchant consideration of the justification for punishment offers a 
superb discussion of the reasons for punishment, and their limitations.  My main quibble with his 
argument for “multiple rationales” is that we must have clearer, consistent defenses for any practice of 
punishment before we apply them; adjusting punishment to after the fact is not sufficient. See 
Theodore Y. Blumoff, Justifying Punishment, 14 CANADIAN J. L. &  JURIS. 161, 162, 201–10 (2001).  
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not to make the victims whole again.  This is because the offense cannot 
be repaired by any consequential arrangement, but also because the wrong 
is too intolerable to go uncensored. Still, whatever the reasons for 
punishment, the actual practice creates intractable quandaries for the law: 
deciding which rights may be limited through punishment, to what degree, 
in what manner.  Perhaps the criminal should lose access to the same 
rights that he “took” from his victim?  In that way, he would share 
something of what his victim suffered.  Through this experience, the 
criminal might achieve a more lucid awareness.  The problem with this 
approach is that there is little cause to think it would improve 
understanding. Rather impress the criminal, particularly if he is 
unrepentant, it could be interpreted as sheer revenge.  Still worse, it leads 
to state down a path of reprehensible cruelty.  Subjecting the rapist 
purposely to rape only reprises a terrible act that should never have 
occurred in the first place. 
Punishment serves to isolate those who have proven themselves to be 
dangerous to the well-being and to the rights of others so that they do not 
harm people further—at least for the time that they are isolated and, one 
hopes, after their release from incarceration. No less essential as a part of 
punishment, however, is that it educates those who are punished about 
rights—theirs and those of others. Thus, punishment should do more than 
just remove the criminal from society. One of its core purposes should be 
to inculcate in its subject a better awareness of his role in society, and 
specifically the importance of rights. Because criminals chose to disregard 
the rights of others, because their skewed mens rea combined with their 
deleterious actus reus revealed their disregard for the rights of others, the 
state should try to make the criminal understand why it is limiting his 
rights as it is.  
The state punishes by holding the subject apart from some of his rights 
in a kind of promissory suspension. It may do this by subjecting the 
criminal to an adverse treatment, or by segregating him from most of 
society and placing him in a more constricted policed environment.69 The 
criminal does not lose or surrender his rights to the state. The state may 
justifiably reduce a criminal’s rights for two reasons only: public safety 
and in order to make the criminal more conscious of what rights are—his 
 
 
           69. In theory, the separate world of incarceration is not simply normal society on a smaller 
scale, but, rather, in a realm that is guarded and controlled. Otherwise criminals would merely be able 
to prey on one another in their new domiciles just as they had in society at large. That is the theory. 
That prisons are in fact very dangerous places is yet further evidence of the ineffectiveness of 
incarceration in practice does not conform to its proposed purpose. See ROBERT A. FERGUSON, 
INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 219 (2014). 
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and others’—and how they coexist in a social environment.  The central 
message to be conveyed to the subject of punishment is: “You have not 
understood what your rights are, and how your exercise of them must not 
be inimical to those of others. Just as the respect and preservation of 
people’s rights is a duty of the state, so is it incumbent on the people 
toward one another.” Punishment that is designed instead to make the 
subject suffer beyond any edifying goal diverges from its purpose. 
A rational method for punishment therefore would be one that is 
concertedly pedagogical and ameliorative. The period mandated in judicial 
sentences would be structured around the time necessary for schooling 
convicts in rights and in the larger lesson of what it means to live in a 
rights-based society. Penal rehabilitative pedagogy demands innovative 
educational methods, such as seminars, counseling, and practica that do 
not merely conform to the practices of conventional schooling.70 
Educational schema will need to be modified to reach each prisoner. 
Sentences should continue for as long as the convicted criminal needs to 
understand how to behave in society, to realize what the borders of his 
rights are, and what the existence of others’ rights demands from him. The 
duration and method of punishment should be driven by the genuine (as 
far as this is determinable) metamorphosis of each convict’s 
consciousness. Whereas current criminal sentencing, comprising a mix of 
custom, suggested guidelines, and the individual judge’s sense of just 
deserts, is oriented around the amount of time to be served, educative 
punishment looks to the progress of the inmates’ comprehension and 
social adjustment. This approach is more consistent with rights, because 
the sentence endures only as long as necessary for the convict truly to 
become aware of rights. 
Of course, this kind of punishment must be something more than a 
civics lesson for the good natured and willing. The convicted criminal 
needs to learn that what he did was cruel and must not be repeated. The 
criminal justice system is routinely confronted with angry, thoughtless, 
and remorseless perpetrators. Many may never regret their crimes absent 
some adverse experience that demonstrates to them the pain for which 
they were responsible. Yet if penalization is too oppressive, it engenders 
resentment, not empathic understanding. 
The pedagogical, reformative goal for punishment must additionally 
abide by the “principle of suitability.” This principle is reminiscent of 
 
 
           70. While she takes a slightly different view of the nature of the purpose of education as a 
form of punishment, Jean Hampton lays out a persuasive defense for its importance. See Jean 
Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 212, 224–26 
(1984). 
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Bentham’s principle of parsimony. 71 But, whereas “parsimony” maintains 
that punishment, in both degree and form, should be no more severe than 
necessary, “suitability” is more specific. Under this principle, punishment 
should be tailored (made suitable) to help reintegrate (made suitable) the 
criminal into society. This means that punishment is not simply a 
restriction on some of the criminal’s rights, but that the state counsel and 
train the person. Moreover, such efforts cannot exclusively on the subject. 
They must work in conjunction with practical programs; education and job 
training must be connected to job placement, budgeting lessons must be 
tied in to housing placement and support services, as necessary.  Not only 
does the suitability principle eschew punishments that are needlessly 
protracted. Degrading, and gratuitous; it requires that they be conducive to 
getting the criminal “back into” society. Punishments that would be barred 
under this rule would include extensive periods in solitary confinement, or 
living conditions so exiguous as to be more bestial than human. 
The regulative basis for precluding a type of punishment is not that we 
find it “extreme.” It is, rather, a minimal standard: whether the punishment 
indicates to the criminal that he has acted wrongly and illegally. For 
example, unless communications between people in detention and the 
outside world are plausibly dangerous or undermine the effectiveness of 
the punishment, criminals’ freedom of expression should be preserved. 
There is also no sound argument to deprive criminals (or ex-convicts) of 
the right to vote.72 The suitability principle entails that serious restrictions 
on a criminal’s rights, such as restrictions on free movement (which would 
also impinge on freedoms of association and, to some degree, 
communication) are permitted only when, and only to the degree 
necessary, the criminal is demonstrably dangerous or prone to recidivism. 
  
 
 
 71. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 169 
(2013). 
 72. For thoughtful arguments against disenfranchisement as a general punishment, see, e.g., 
Richard L. Lippke, The Disenfranchisement of Felons, 20 L. & PHIL. 553 (2001); ELIZABETH HINTON, 
FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN 
AMERICA 335–36 (2016). 
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Behind all this discussion lurks yet another set of questions that are 
ineluctable for which the solutions are elusive.  We must be able to answer 
them if we are to sustain a consistent legal system that encompasses both 
rights and punishments for crimes: how can we know just which rights 
should be affected, or that the justification for the reduction in rights that 
comes with a punishment is correct?  The recommendations offered here 
aim to keep criminal penalization as consistent as possible with rights 
while acknowledging that the criminal has failed in his perception of 
rights. He does not comprehend (or care to) his own rights nor does he 
understand, or value, the rights of others. 
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